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Article

Tort Law and the American Economy
Frank B. Cross†
It is common to hear claims that tort law is undermining
the ability of America to grow economically. Tort liability imposes costs on businesses, who complain about its detrimental
effects on investment and innovation. While many of these reports are anecdotal, or even false, there is growing evidence on
the economic effect of tort law. Tort reform proposals are
pressed, and often passed, on the basis of economic concerns. In
this narrative, the law is unduly pro-plaintiff, which discourages business investment and innovation and needlessly raises
the costs of products.1
Despite these common claims of the economic harms of tort
law, there is a remarkable paucity of actual study on the question. Only very limited research exists on the effects of tort law
on state economies, and much of that research considers only
particular tort reforms and not the overall state of a state‘s law.
Many factors will influence the economies of the various states,
of which tort law is but one. However, if its economic effect
were truly profound, one would expect to see some economic
benefit, on some measure, for states with relatively prodefendant tort law.
I examine the effects of tort law using indices created by
two pro-defendant organizations, the United States Chamber of
† Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs
School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. Copyright © 2011 by Frank B. Cross.
1. Some contend that the stories about the effect of tort law are distorted
and overblown. See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004) (presenting evidence that interest groups and the media have greatly exaggerated
unrepresentative stories about tort law). However, just as anecdotal evidence
cannot prove a claim, neither can demonstrating the inaccuracy of such anecdotal evidence disprove the claim.
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Commerce and the Pacific Research Institute. While both
groups believe that tort law hampers the economy, there is no
reason to think these organizations should have a bias for or
against particular states in their rating system, and their position on tort law makes their metrics ideal for an independent
test of tort law‘s effect.
This study considers those measures of state tort liability
regimes and economic measures. I consider the often-used
Chamber of Commerce measure of tort law (a perceptual measure) and the Pacific Research Institute‘s measure of specific legal doctrines. The findings should significantly inform tort
reform debates. The primary reason offered for such reform is
the perceived adverse economic consequences of tort doctrines.2
A finding that tort law has such adverse effects would therefore
be important. However, my research finds no such association
between tort law and economic harm.
I. THE CONTROVERSY OVER TORT LAW
For decades now, a controversy has raged about tort law
and its economic consequences. Defendants, especially businesses, complain of excessive, and often unfairly imposed, tort
liability. The risks of tort liability allegedly include the unjustified transfer of wealth and the deterrence of valuable economic
activity.3
Some argue that ―litigants often exploit the litigation
process strategically for private gain at the expense of social
welfare.‖4 Philip K. Howard argues that the law is suffocating
America.5 While occasional anecdotes about verdicts command
public attention, the greater cost may be associated with the
―complexity and expense of settling the vast majority of suits
2. There are also noneconomic concerns, such as distributional questions.
See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Demographics of Tort
Reform, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2008) (finding that tort reforms had a
relatively more adverse effect on certain demographic groups, such as women,
children, and the elderly). However, these concerns could be addressed
through redistribution of greater wealth if tort reform did indeed produce
more wealth.
3. Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE:
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 1, 2 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
4. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850
(2004).
5. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA passim (1994).
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that never go to trial, the chilling threat of suits over a widening range of issues, [and] the preparations needed to lessen the
chances of being sued.‖6 This results in the deployment of
―larg[e] armies of vigilant lawyers engaged in a kind of legal
equivalent of [a] defensive cold war.‖7 This obviously comes at a
cost to the economy.8
A. ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW
While tort litigation is commonly considered economically
harmful, in theory it should be economically beneficial. The
system is designed to force the internalization of costs imposed
on others. A business would have less incentive to produce safe
products if injured parties could not force the business to pay
for their damages.9 This should cause more efficient product
decisions, as businesses will not produce products whose harm
(as measured in tort damages) exceeds their benefits. The economic costs associated with dangerous products may be considerable.10 Any failure to internalize these external costs would
―violate the marginal conditions of optimal resource allocation
and may become a major cause of inefficiencies.‖11 Tort law
serves ―social purposes,‖ most prominently the compensation of
innocent victims and ―deterring behavior that presents risks
that exceed their social value.‖12
6. Pietro S. Nivola, American Social Regulation Meets the Global Economy, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 16, 23 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997 ). Less obvious costs, such as effects on morale, hours devoted to recordkeeping, and lack of innovation may
add ―tens of billions‖ of dollars to the true cost of tort liability in the United
States. Id. at 34.
7. Id. at 23; see also id. at 34 (complaining that ―firms must devote substantial resources to warding off predators even when no complaint has been
filed‖ ).
8. Id. at 23.
9. John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION,
supra note 3, at 120, 183–84.
10. See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Social Costs of Dangerous Products: An
Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 775, 791–829 (2009)
(considering only three such dangerous products and concluding that they cost
nearly $5 billion since 1990).
11. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private
Loss and Social Cost, 17 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 589 (1997); see also Shapiro et al., supra note 10, at 777 (describing how the ―tort system improves market efficiency by forcing the sellers of dangerous products to pay for costs that
would otherwise be borne by other parties‖ ).
12. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1150
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Deterrence not only avoids negative accident costs but
should also expand the number of economic transactions.
People are relatively more reluctant to buy a product if it is
more likely to harm them and if they have no recourse should
such harm occur. Thus, in the ―absence of standards, labels,
and legal recourse against negligent producers, people might
decline to purchase drugs, foods, and other consumer goods at
prices that reflect their real economic value.‖13 This would have
the effect of decreasing economic activity and economic growth.
The expected economic benefits of tort law (beyond simply
compensating deserving victims) stem largely from deterring
the imposition of external costs on others for no compensation,
such as by causing physical harm.14 The success of this deterrence is subject to empirical dispute. Some ―studies of particular industries have found little evidence that American tort law
consistently or significantly affects product design or safety.‖15
However, some tort reforms in the area of medical malpractice
apparently have resulted in an increase in medical misbehavior.16 Surveys of companies show a substantial number reporting that product liability law had induced them to improve the
safety of their products.17 Unfortunately, numerous factors out-

(1992). The classic explication of these effects is discussed in GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970)
(suggesting that ―the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of
the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents‖ ).
13. Nivola, supra note 6, at 31.
14. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The
Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910–11
(2008) (describing the theory of deterrence benefits).
15. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 142 (2001). There is no association of insurance premiums and injury
rates. George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184, 186 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). Nor was there a association between times of increased tort
liability and changes in injury and death rates. Id. at 194. This research is
more ―exploratory‖ than conclusive, however, and failed to ―distinguish other
factors‖ that could be relevant to the findings. Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 6.
16. See Claudia E. Lavenant et al., Tort Reform and Physician Sanctioning, 24 LAW & POL‘Y 1, 10 tbl.1 (2002) (finding a correlation between jointliability reform and higher rates of serious sanctions).
17. DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1996) (reporting that 35% of companies had
improved the safety of their products and 47% had improved product usage
and warranties as a result of product liability law).
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side the tort liability system influence product safety, making it
difficult to isolate the effect of the law.18
At some level, the deterrence is simply logical economics.
Those who must pay more for a given product (injuring others)
will buy less of that product. The clearest evidence of this
comes from the field of auto insurance. Some governments have
eliminated traditional liability insurance in favor of no-fault
systems in which compensation is unhinged from tortious behavior. A number of studies have found that this switch was
accompanied by a statistically significant increase in auto accidents or fatalities.19 As injuring others became cheap, there
were more injuries. Similar results have been found for the effect of dram shop laws.20 At least major tort law changes clearly
show the expected deterrent value of tort liability.21
18. Much product safety comes from consumer preferences and firms‘ reputations. Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 22 (calling this the ―principal impetus for developing and producing safe products‖). Other factors include ―moral
principles discouraging people from needlessly inflicting risk and harm on
others, the risk of hazardous behavior for the acting party‘s own safety, market forces driving unsafe products out or internalizing job hazards in wage differentials, and the regulatory programs put in place by the government.‖ Ben
C.J. van Velthoven, Empirics of Tort, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 453, 454
(Michael Faure ed., 2009). An examination of these other factors in the context
of automobile safety concluded that product liability was not strictly ―necessary‖ to safety improvements, but that it was ―often a sufficient or contributing cause of safety improvements.‖ Graham, supra note 9. In addition, various
government agencies also regulate the safety of many products and prevent
the sale of unsafe products. Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability,
Innovation, and Safety in the Chemical Industry, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, supra note 3, at 367,
370.
19. See J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 J.L. & ECON. 427, 454 –55 (2001) (finding association of
no-fault systems and higher fatality rates in the United States); Elisabeth M.
Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 49–50
(1982) (finding increased accident losses in no-fault states in America); R. Ian
McEwin, No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence, 9 INT‘L
REV. L. & ECON. 13, 14 (1989) (confirming this effect in New Zealand); Marshall H. Medoff & Joseph P. Magaddino, An Empirical Analysis of No-Fault
Insurance, 6 EVALUATION REV. 373, 388 (1982) (identifying no-fault laws as a
significant factor in state loss ratios); Peter L. Swan, The Economics of Law:
Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No-Fault Insurance, Occupational
Licensing and Criminology, AUSTL. ECON. REV., 3d Quarter 1984, at 92, 100
(identifying increased accident and injury risks in New Zealand).
20. See, e.g., Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-Vehicle Fatalities, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 184 (1993); Lan Liang et al.,
Precaution, Compensation, and Threats of Sanction: The Case of Alcohol Servers, 24 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 67–68 (2004); Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein et
al., Civil Liability, Criminal Law, and Other Policies and Alcohol-Related Mo-
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A recent study of malpractice liability22 may provide the
most convincing evidence of tort costs and benefits. The authors
of this study used the generosity of local juries as their measure
of tort liability.23 They found that a 10% reduction in malpractice costs would reduce Medicare health care expenditures by at
most 1.2%, but that a 10% increase in malpractice costs would
reduce mortality by about 0.2%.24 Given the value of a life, the
net effect of malpractice liability is probably positive. Moreover,
the authors considered only mortality;25 assuming that a similar effect would apply to morbidity, the benefits of malpractice
law would be still greater. This analysis was only one study,
though, and limited to medical malpractice.
Indeed, there is an argument that there is not enough tort
law in America and that economic inefficiency results from insufficient liability. A very small percentage of injured Americans file suit, even when another party may be responsible.26
Considerable research in the area of medical malpractice shows
that most parties with legitimate cases took no legal action.27
An insufficient number of filed claims could also lead to an inadequate amount of deterrence, and some suggest the real ―tort
crisis‖ is that ―too few victims claim.‖28 In addition, when suits

tor Vehicle Fatalities in the United States: 1984 –1995, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 723, 729–32 (2000).
21. For a good summary of the research on the deterrent effect of tort law,
see van Velthoven, supra note 18.
22. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15,383, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15383.pdf.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
26. Only about ten percent of those who suffer from accidents file suit. See
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 110 (1991).
27. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation
and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1089–91
(2006) (summarizing studies to this effect). Two examples are Lori Andrews,
Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005) (reporting that just over one percent of patients who suffered a medical error filed suit), and David M. Studdert et al.,
Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38
MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000) (reporting that 97% of those patients who suffered
a negligent injury did not sue).
28. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 443, 447, 460 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Saks, supra note 12, at
1183–89 (summarizing research to this effect).
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are filed and won, the amount of damages may be unduly low.29
Thus, the economic problems with our tort system may be the
opposite of those commonly claimed. The safety problems associated with chemicals may be ascribed to this insufficiency of
litigation.30
Theoretically, a good tort system should be economically
beneficial. The conservative, pro-tort reform public interest organization, the Pacific Research Institute, explained:
An efficient tort system is an important part of a thriving freeenterprise economy. It ensures that firms have proper incentives to
produce safe products in a safe environment, and that truly injured
people are fully compensated. An efficient tort system results in
greater trust among market participants, leading to more trading,
and eventually a higher standard of living for individuals in the society. An efficient tort system benefits all.
A poor tort system, on the other hand, imposes excessive costs on
society, not the least of which is foregone production of goods and services. There is growing evidence that U.S. tort costs are far greater
than other countries‘ costs and that much of the difference is due to
excessive litigation and lawsuit abuse. All of us shoulder the burden
of an excessively expensive and inefficient tort liability system
through higher prices, lower wages, decreased returns on investment
in capital and land, restricted access to health care, and less innovation.31

Tort law is not per se harmful to the economy, but an inefficient tort system is. Therefore, the question is whether the
American system is, as PRI claims, unduly pro-plaintiff and
imposing excessive costs, or if it is more reasonable and efficient, producing net benefits to society. Originally, many
thought that ―judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-

29. Most malpractice actions containing strong legal claims receive much
less than full compensation of even their economic losses. KAGAN, supra note
15, at 140. A study of dangerous products found that tort compensation was
less than the actual costs of those products. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and
Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 95–97 (1989)
(reporting that the amounts of judgments and settlements in product liability
litigation was often less than the actual losses suffered by the victim). Compensation awarded in wrongful death actions is much less than the amount
that economists have calculated as the reasonable value of a life. See Frank
Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1916–
23 (2006).
30. See Ashford & Stone, supra note 18, at 367 (finding the liability from
torts well below the benchmark for optimal deterrence of harms).
31. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2008 REPORT 1 (2008), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/
docLib/20080222_2008_US_Tort_Liability_Index.pdf.
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promoting.‖32 The basic theory is that the common law evolves
through litigated cases, though many claims are settled.33
When a rule is inefficient, creating deadweight losses, there is a
greater incentive to litigate to have it overturned.34 Given
enough challenges, the inefficient rule will be changed, while
efficient rules are less likely to be litigated.35 This process
steers the common law in the direction of greater economic efficiency.36 Some have even maintained that ―[c]ommon law does
not fit in a rent-seeking world.‖37
The notion of common law efficiency has come under considerable criticism, however. Judges see only a small number of
cases applying a rule, and the cases they see may well be unrepresentative.38 Barriers to efficiency include the stickiness of
legal rules and the fact that rules of law are public goods in
which we can expect litigants to under-invest.39 Given the path
dependence of precedent,40 an inefficient rule may be amplified
as it is increasingly litigated.41
Public choice analysis, commonly applied to legislative
analysis, can also be applied to judicial decision making, and
may seriously undermine claims of economically efficient legal
evolution. Repeat players, such as large companies, may manipulate their settlement practices so as to channel the law in a
32. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523 (4th ed. 1992).
33. See, e.g., George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65–66 (1977).
34. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
51, 61 (1977).
35. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of
the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 393–94 (1978); Priest, supra note 33,
at 75; Rubin, supra note 34.
36. Goodman, supra note 35, at 394; Priest, supra note 33, at 81; Rubin,
supra note 34, at 61.
37. Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 956 (1999).
38. See generally Gillian Hadfield, Biases in the Evolution of Legal Rules,
80 GEO. L.J. 583, 605–14 (1992) (discussing the effect of restricted information
on judicial efficiency).
39. Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency:
Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429 (2005).
40. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 941 (2005). ―Path dependence‖ refers to the ―history of
problems that had to be solved in the past but that may be irrelevant today.‖
Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996).
41. See Hirsch, supra note 39, at 428 (―[T]he doctrine of precedent stacks
the adversarial deck against a party who seeks to revise a rule, whether or not
the existing rule is efficient.‖).
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direction favorable to their future liability risks.42 The evolution of nuisance law to favor industrial polluters has been cited
as an example of this effect.43 Such precedent purchasing
through litigation would undermine an efficient common law of
tort, presumably making the law unduly pro-defendant. The
―haves‖ would tend to come out ahead in court battles.44 Insofar
as this effect operates, it suggests that tort law is doing too little to internalize externalities.
Some have argued that plaintiffs‘ lawyers engage in similar practices to expand tort liability law. Todd Zywicki argues
that the ―driving force behind many of the innovations in tort
law in recent decades has been the plaintiffs‘ bar, pushing for
expansion of liability under the tort system as well as increasing complexity in the tort system.‖45 Defense lawyers have no
economic incentive to counteract this effect, because they too
profit from additional litigation.46 Judges may be complicit in
these efforts.47 This process has allegedly ―made a mockery of
the law and has eliminated a wide range of otherwise viable
goods and services from the American marketplace.‖48
The empirical evidence supporting this claim is limited.
One study examined the development of the abolition of privity
doctrine for product liability and attributed it to rent-seeking
42. See Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 355, 366–68 (1999) (discussing the possibility of ―precedent-purchasing‖).
43. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
205, 216–17 (1982).
44. See Marc Galanter, Why the ―Haves‖ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 95, 123–24 (1974).
45. Todd Zywicki, Public Choice and Tort Reform 4 (George Mason Univ.
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-36, 2000), available at http://
www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/00-36.pdf?q=avoiding
-tort-liability-avoiding-tort-liability-what-works; see also Paul H. Rubin &
Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 807, 808 (1994) (claiming that the ―shape of modern product liability
law is due to the interests of tort lawyers‖).
46. Zywicki, supra note 45, at 6–7. Richard Epstein has suggested that it
is ―in the interest of defendant firms to have a pro-plaintiff set of rules, which
makes their own defensive efforts worthwhile for the manufacturers that hire
them.‖ Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 313 (1988). Legal academics may also share culpability in this process. See Zywicki, supra note 45, at 19–22.
47. See Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers’
Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1793 (1994) (arguing that ―policyoriented jurists‖ have a ―symbiotic relationship‖ with plaintiffs‘ attorneys).
48. GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW 52 (The
Locke Institute, The Blackstone Commentaries No. 1, 1997).
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litigation by tort lawyers.49 Another found that states with
more lawyers were quicker to abandon contributory negligence
in favor of comparative negligence.50 Both studies have serious
shortcomings, not least that the new pro-plaintiff documents
seem more economically efficient.51 The research did not effectively distinguish between judicial and legislative adoption of
doctrines, however, and study of additional doctrines did not
confirm the results.52
Additionally, even if the rules of tort law were efficient, the
system could still fail in practice.53 The ―performance of the liability system quickly becomes theoretically ambiguous if the
system imposes transactions costs or erroneously assigns liability.‖54 It may be that the costs of operating the tort law system
are so great that they outweigh any practical economic benefits.
Litigation costs themselves are great and may equal or even
exceed the amount paid out to deserving plaintiffs.55 The high
transaction costs may also distort payments. Defendants may
choose to settle wholly illegitimate claims simply because the
costs of litigation exceeded the settlement payments.56

49. Rubin & Bailey, supra note 45.
50. Christopher Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule
in the United States, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 327 (1992).
51. See Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523, 574 –75 (1996) (citing research to this effect).
52. Id. at 575–79.
53. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3 (noting that ―[r]egardless of its net
overall effects, the tort system may still be inefficient‖ because of the costs of
administering it).
54. DANIEL P. KESSLER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE LIABILITY SYSTEM 4 (The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Essays in Public
Policy No. 91, 1999).
55. See Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the ―Crisis‖ in the Civil Justice System
Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (2005) (reporting that
plaintiffs were ―receiving less than 50% of the money spent on litigation‖); Joni
Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial
Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 330 (2007) (reporting that total transaction costs for each dollar received by claimants reach $0.83 in cases where a
suit was filed with an attorney).
56. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849,
1857 (2004) (discussing this problem). However, the materiality of such nuisance settlements is unknown. Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement
―Problem‖: The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 224 (2007).
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The transaction costs of tort litigation exceed those of alternative compensation schemes like workers‘ compensation.57
On the other hand, the cheaper schemes generally do not attempt to distinguish between deserving and undeserving injured parties, sacrificing the efficiency advantages of tort law.
The costs are associated primarily with this differentiation and
may therefore be useful.58 Screening out bad claims is key to
the law and its efficiency. Studying this effect, Charles Silver
found no evidence that alternative dispute resolution systems
were more efficient and concluded that the tort litigation system operated efficiently.59 In any event, the high administrative costs of the tort law system must be considered when assessing its economic effect.
Tort law may fail to efficiently apportion liability because
each case is so unique. There is a contention that whether a
tort plaintiff is compensated ―in a product liability case depends
on various matters of chance such as the relative skills of the
attorneys on each side, the composition of the jury, and the timing of case resolution relative to the timing of information
about injury causation coming to light.‖60 Random variation in
numerous surrounding facts could produce inefficient results
even with an efficient set of legal standards.61 If so, the tort
system could function inefficiently, much like a lottery,62
though some suggest this is unlikely.63 Consequently, one must
57. See 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS‘ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILIPERSONAL INJURY 119 (1991) (suggesting that workers‘ compensation
administrative costs are only 15–20% of overall payouts, while the tort system‘s costs are 50–55%).
58. Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
2073, 2078–80 (2002).
59. See id. at 2106–07 (finding that without ADR, litigants in the existing
tort system ―are minimizing litigation costs on their own‖).
60. Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 291 n.138.
61. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 21 (claiming that ―the uncertainty
of the tort system is its greatest vice, magnifying risks of liability while disconnecting them from unduly risky conduct‖).
62. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Heal the
Law, Then Health Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B7 (commenting that
―[t]he legal system today is a string of ad hoc decisions‖ and ―[ j]ustice . . . is
basically random‖).
63. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 27, at 1086–87 (characterizing the
liability system as a market of ―sophisticated, economically-oriented repeat
players‖ who ―have the knowledge and incentives to select efficient means to
accomplish their respective ends‖ and noting that ―[g]iven this backdrop, their
behavior and the behavior of the system . . . should not be random‖). The auTY FOR
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consider both the substantive rules of tort law and procedural
factors in evaluating the American tort liability system.
It is possible that, notwithstanding all these limitations on
the efficiency of tort litigation, it could still be economically
beneficial. Tort law can be a substitute for government regulation and international comparisons have found this to be the
case.64 When compared with legislative solutions, ―litigation
may in fact be an efficient means of resolving social conflicts.‖65
More pro-defendant tort law regimes could be associated with
more aggressive regulatory regimes, and reliance on tort litigation may be economically beneficial.
B. TORT COSTS
As noted above, there is a widespread belief that the tort
system imposes unfair costs on defendants, creating economic
inefficiency and harming society at large. Some researchers
have sought to measure these costs and quantify their magnitude.
Pacific Research Institute (PRI) recently alleged that excessive tort costs in the United States amount to $589 billion
per year.66 This estimate, though, is simply a comparison of the
estimated costs of torts in the United States with those of other
advanced countries.67 This is an unreliable measure, because
tort law plays different roles in different nations.68 In the United States, tort costs may be higher because the direct government regulatory system (with criminal enforcement) in this nation is smaller, with more reliance placed on civil justice
thors suggest that empirical studies of the system show it to be ―stable and predictable‖ and able to sort ―valid from invalid claims reasonably well.‖ Id. at 1087.
64. KAGAN, supra note 15, at 126–28.
65. Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Variation in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (2009).
66. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN ET AL., PAC. RESEARCH INST., JACKPOT JUSTICE: THE TRUE COST OF AMERICA‘S TORT SYSTEM xiii (2007). This study came
under considerable criticism, though. See Tom Baker, Herbert Kritzer & Neil
Vidmar, Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System: Thinking Beyond
Junk Science 2, 3 (William Mitchell Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 95, July 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1152306
(contending that the report was advocacy disguised as science); Richard Posner, Is the Tort System Costing the United States $865 Billion a Year?, THE
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 1, 2007, 7:22 PM), http://www.becker-posner
-blog.com/2007/04/is-the-tort-system-costing-the-united-states-865-billion-a
-year--posner.html (identifying various errors in the study methodology).
67. See Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 8.
68. See id.
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through torts.69 Robert Kagan has demonstrated this international effect, with an argument that America should rely more
on regulation and less on tort litigation.70 This may be true, but
it means that the net costs of tort law cannot be measured
across countries because they have different institutions devoted to achieving the accident-reducing goal of tort law and
the data to make such a comparison does not exist.
Another study, by the Council of Economic Advisers under
President George W. Bush, put the annual direct costs of the
tort litigation system at $180 billion (1.8% of GDP),
representing a functional tax of 2% on consumption, 3% on
wages, or 5% on capital income.71 This analysis made no at-

69. See KAGAN, supra note 15, at 127–28.
70. Id. at 126–55; see also Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote
to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1141 (1996) (emphasizing that unlike the
other nations studied, ―we do not have an administrative state with intensive
governmental regulation of risks, nor do we have a comprehensive welfare
state‖). The lessened tort liability in other nations may be due to factors such
as public entitlements or alternative compensation systems. WERNER PFENNIGSTORF & DONALD J. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW
AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES
160 (1991); see also Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 9 (observing
that ―[o]ther countries have stronger regulatory mechanisms that eliminate
the need for some types of tort claims‖ or have ―[s]ocial welfare systems [that]
may reduce the need to rely upon tort claims for support and compensation
after injury‖).
71. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 1 (2002). These
estimates came from TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2000,
TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM (2002). The
Council of Economic Advisers recognizes that not all these costs are excessive
but estimates that $136 billion of them are. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra at 10. Although it was relied upon by President Bush‘s Council of Economic Advisers, the reliability and accuracy of the Tillinghast estimates have been
criticized. See, e.g., Baker, Kritzer & Vidmar, supra note 66, at 4 (suggesting
that ―regulators deliberately designed the reporting system to require the insurance industry to err on the high side‖ and that a third of the costs were
based on malpractice and self-insured expenditures ―for which there [were] no
reliable, publicly available data‖); Lawrence Chimerine & Ross Eisenbrey, The
Frivolous Case for Tort Law Change: Opponents of the Legal System Exaggerrate Its Costs, Ignore Its Benefits 2–3 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No.
157, 2005) (noting that the study disregarded benefits, exaggerated costs,
showed no correlation with economic outcomes, included the insurance industry‘s own administrative expenses, and included other flawed costs). Other research has concluded that the cost of insuring products liability is only about
0.2% of corporate revenues. CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR
AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW
219 (2001).
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tempt to consider the countervailing economic benefits associated with tort litigation, however.72
Critics of the tort system often characterize the costs of litigation as a ―tort tax.‖73 The former board chairman of Home
Depot complained that a ―tort tax‖ cost every American $2400
per year.74 One writer opined in the Wall Street Journal that
tort costs represented over 2% of the gross national product and
would amount to $4.8 trillion over a ten year period.75 A later
opinion piece updated this figure to estimate the cost of torts at
over $865 billion per year.76
There are some obvious flaws in these cost estimates for
the tort system. In addition to failing to consider the benefits of
tort litigation, such measures of cost make the economic mistake of conflating an economic transfer with an economic cost.
This money expended on the tort system is not lost to society,
but simply transferred to other parties (from defendants to
plaintiffs, lawyers, and others who gain from the system).
When a verdict transfers money to a plaintiff, that event is a
cost to the defendant but not directly to society. Society has the
same wealth, some of it is simply held in different hands.77 ―Because the tort action results in a direct transfer payment, there
is no deadweight loss in the economic analysis model . . . .‖78
Of course, some transfer payments may result in deadweight loss. If money is transferred from a person who would
72. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71.
73. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 3–5 (1988). Over twenty years ago, Peter Huber claimed the
existence of such a tort tax was harming the United States‘ commercial competitiveness. Id. at 228–30.
74. See Editorial, A Barrister ’s Baloney, INVESTOR‘S BUS. DAILY (L.A.),
Dec. 5, 2008, at A10.
75. Jim Copland, Op-Ed., The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A10.
76. Lawrence J. McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, Op-Ed., The Tort Tax,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2007, at A18.
77. This distinction is often discussed in antitrust law, where economists
typically do not regard the excess profits of a monopolist as an economic loss to
society. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 505 (observing that ―antitrust economists are
generally agnostic about these wealth transfers‖); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 711 (1977)
(suggesting that the ―transformation of benefits from one form (consumers‘
surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under the conventional welfare economics model‖).
78. Donald V. Macdougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives—
Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 644 (1985).
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use it more efficiently to one who would use it less efficiently,
there is some deadweight loss. More relevant to tort law, if the
law over-deters, it may prevent the introduction of useful products, which could produce a net loss to society.79 Of course, if
the law under-deters, the social loss comes from insufficient
tort liability and inefficient allocation of risk.80 The point is
that one cannot simply use the amount of tort liability payments as a measure of the system‘s economic costs. The true
cost estimates come in the form of indirect effects on society,
positive or negative.
One central indirect effect is on product innovation and development.81 Defenders of the tort system argue that it offers a
great benefit by encouraging safer products, as business seeks
to avoid the costs of liability associated with producing a less
safe product.82 A model system would require manufacturers to
internalize the external harms caused by their business. However, critics of the tort system contend that it actually discourages innovation and new products.83 While an optimal tort liability system should encourage efficient innovation, ―unchecked
and unbalanced tort law can limit the availability of necessary
medical services, discourage innovation, lead to the removal of
useful and safe products and devices from the marketplace, and
increase costs to consumers.‖84 Some suggest that ―the broad
and unpredictable sweep of U.S. liability law deters innovation.‖85 There are numerous examples of various products, in-

79. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 647 (2003).
80. Cf. R. William Ide III, The Role of the Justice System in the Product
Liability Debate, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN
AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 37, 43 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones
eds., 1994) (describing American‘s product liability system as a competitive
advantage in the global marketplace when ―it provides a fair, open system in
which consumers with legitimate claims can be protected while also shielding
manufacturers against unwarranted claims‖).
81. Such innovation is generally regarded as crucial to economic wellbeing. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107
MICH. L. REV. 285, 286 (2008). See generally DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF ECONOMIC DISCOVERY (2006) (addressing the importance of innovation to economic growth).
82. Ide, supra note 80, at 40– 41.
83. La Fetra, supra note 79.
84. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation
Between State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort
Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
85. Huber & Litan, supra note 3.
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cluding medical advances, that were not introduced because of
liability fears.86
For the critics of our current system, even ―the prospect of
tort liability . . . inhibits innovation.‖87 The theory is that liability is so costly and unpredictable that companies will shun new
product development out of fear for future unforeseen liability.
Michael Porter contends that our system of product liability ―is
so extreme and uncertain as to retard innovation.‖88 Some
products are occasionally cited in support of this contention,
such as vaccines and small aircraft production.89 A Conference
Board survey has reported that some businesses have abandoned new products because of liability fears,90 though some
caution is warranted in interpreting survey results.91
Yet others argue that the threat of tort liability has served
its purpose in deterring unsafe product innovation.92 Benjamin
Barton examined playground design as an example of the

86. See id. at 7.
87. La Fetra, supra note 79, at 646; see also Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCI. 1395, 1395–96 (1989) ( blaming the threat of punitive damages
for discouraging new product innovation); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note
81, at 286 (contending that tort law‘s reliance on custom as a standard has the
effect of discouraging innovation).
88. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649
(1990); see also Man C. Maloo & Benjamin A. Neil, Products Liability Exposure: The Sacrifice of American Innovation, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 361, 362 (1991)
(contending that ―[t]he fear of products liability lawsuits, and a legal system
which encourages their institution and permits huge damage awards, are having a chilling effect on technological innovation‖); Dick Thornburgh, America’s
Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074, 1078
(1996) (arguing that ―[t]he threat of liability has significantly inhibited the
product development and innovation needed to provide improved services to
consumers and to assure a leadership role . . . worldwide‖).
89. See, e.g., Bruce E. Peterman, General Aviation Engineering in a Product Liability Environment, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 80, at 62, 62–67 (small
aircraft); John P. Wilson, The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manufacture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495,
504 (1994) (vaccines).
90. E. PATRICK MCGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 17–18 (The
Conference Bd., Research Reports No. 908, 1988).
91. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that survey respondents,
―especially top-level corporate officials, can be quick to blame external forces
for problems arising elsewhere‖).
92. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 137, 148–70 (1995) (arguing that the existing tort liability structure provides appropriate safety incentives for future innovation).
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threat of tort liability producing valuable innovation.93 Viscusi
and Moore have conducted analyses that generally show that at
lower product liability costs, innovation is encouraged but that
unusually high costs can deter valuable innovation.94 One
study, though, compared tort costs as a percentage of GDP and
overall research and development spending and found no correlation between the two.95
Another commonly invoked cost of the tort system is international competitiveness.96 The unusually high liability costs of
the American system purportedly make our products less able
to compete with the output of other countries with less intrusive systems of tort law.97 The infamous Texaco/Pennzoil decision alone reportedly harmed our competitiveness by increasing
the costs of doing business, inhibiting business transactions,
and creating uncertainty.98
A survey of senior executives found that a majority believed that ―the U.S. civil justice system significantly hampers
the ability of U.S. companies to compete with Japanese and
European companies.‖99 The Commerce Department has reported that ―[f]ear of litigation is among the top issues listed by
senior executives who manage internationally owned U.S.
businesses.‖100 Studies by Eurochambres and the Organization
93. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground Design, 58 FLA. L. REV. 265, 270 (2006).
94. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and
Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 161–64 (1993).
95. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 10.
96. See, e.g., Ji Yao Shen et al., Challenges Facing U.S. Manufacturing
and Strategies, 23 J. INDUS. TECH., Apr.–Oct. 2007, at 1, 5 (declaring that the
American ―tort system undermines the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers‖); Philip Shuchman, It Isn’t that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It’s Just
that the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L.J. 485, 504 (1997) (noting that ―[m]any concerned groups, public and private, claim that U.S. product
liability laws are a significant factor and sometimes the most important cause
of what is perceived as a decline in the competitiveness of U.S. firms in the international market‖).
97. See Thornburgh, supra note 88, at 1077–78.
98. John Diebold, The Texaco-Pennzoil Aftershocks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1988, at A19 (examining the effects of the decision allowing a $10.53 billion
tort award in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).
99. The Verdict from the Corner Office, BUS. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66, 66.
However, another survey of risk managers of major American companies
found that ―the impact of the liability issue seems far more related to rhetoric
than to reality.‖ NATHAN WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 2 (The Conference Bd., Research Reports No. 893, 1987).
100. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 2 (2008).
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for International Investment likewise found concern over tort
liability among international investors, who cited it as a drawback to investing in the United States.101 However, the actual
effects of tort litigation are uncertain, and there is little reliable
evidence on this issue.102
The costs of the alleged tort tax may also be exaggerated.
One thorough study estimated that the average cost was ―at
most . . . as high as 2 percent of the cost of all products and services sold in the United States,‖103 and the author found no material association between liability costs and exports among the
seven industries studied.104 Similarly, the Commerce Department observed that foreign investment in this country surged
at a time when tort costs as a percentage of GDP were at their
peak.105 It appears that greater liability ―might sharpen, rather
than blunt, the competitive edge of U.S. producers,‖ as their
products had an enhanced reputation for quality.106
Moreover, to evaluate the costs of the tort tax internationally, one must consider the benefits of tort litigation.107 The net
costs of any tort tax must also be reduced by actual taxes collected by other nations in their public compensation systems
that replace tort law. Ultimately the research on the economic
effect of the United States tort liability system is indeterminate, unless these effects are considered.
C. THE ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW IN COURTS AND THE
LEGISLATURE
The concern over the economic effects of tort law has found
its way into some judicial decisions. Justice Ketchum of the
West Virginia Supreme Court has argued that medical moni-

101. Id. at 5–6.
102. See id. at 10 (noting that ―not enough evidence or research currently
exists to determine the litigation environment‘s actual effects‖ on foreign direct investment, so that ―additional quantitative data is needed to guide policymakers‖).
103. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 128–
29 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
104. Id. at 143.
105. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, supra note 100, at 11.
106. Nivola, supra note 6, at 36.
107. See PORTER, supra note 88 (noting that product liability ―can benefit
competitive advantage by acting like a sophisticated buyer to encourage the
development of better products‖). Porter believes, though, that the U.S. system
fails to achieve this benefit because product liability litigation is excessive. Id.
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toring claims could leave the state‘s ―economy in shambles.‖108
This was simply an impressionistic evaluation, though, that did
not use the research on the economic effects of tort law.
The research on economic effects has been invoked in some
recent opinions. Courts have been loath to rely directly upon
this research, considering this a ―policy dispute[].‖109 More frequently, courts have deferred to the legislature‘s findings on
the economic research. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted
that the legislature reasonably used studies from the National
Bureau of Economic Research, the Council of Economic Advisors, and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, as well as a Harris poll
and testimony from a state officer when finding that tort litigation represented ―a challenge to the economy.‖110
This sort of economic research should be relevant to the
state of tort law. Although it is not the only factor (matters of
distributive justice may be considered), economic consequences
surely are relevant to at least legislative action. Concerns over
economic and other external effects have influenced the tort
reform movement in state legislatures. Moreover, such pragmatic concerns may influence the judiciary, even if they are not
expressly relied upon in opinions.111 Hence, the evaluation of
economic effects may be legally salient.
II. RESEARCH ON TORT LAW AND THE ECONOMY
If the tort litigation climate in a given state significantly
affects economic performance, then one would expect that the
tort litigation climate should have an effect on business decisions. The business consultants at McKinsey & Co. have reported that ―tort risks are second in importance in deciding
where to establish operations.‖112 The Chamber of Commerce
reported that as many as 82 percent of survey respondents said
108. Perrine v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 918 (W.
Va. 2010) (Ketchum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 140 (Utah 2004); see also Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem‘l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 919 (Ill. 2010) (finding that ―[ p]ublic policy
determinations of this kind are ultimately a matter for the legislature‖).
110. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 434 (Ohio 2007) (quoting 2004 Ohio Laws 8,024).
111. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230 (2008) (suggesting
that most judges are pragmatists in practice).
112. Lawrence J. McQuillan & Mark Kriss, Op-Ed., To Revive New York’s
Economy, Attack Lawsuit Abuse, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www
.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/11/18/2009-11-18_to_revive_new_yorks_economy_
attack_lawsuit_abuse.html.
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that the legal climate was a factor in business location decisions.113 Such a significant factor should show up in economic
outcome measurements.
Some research has already tested the effects of tort law on
economic variables. Much of this research has involved particular areas of law (such as medical malpractice), individual doctrines (such as joint and several liability) or discrete economic
measures (such as labor productivity). Unfortunately, there is
little research on overall economic effects of the tort litigation
environment. The research that exists is generally not rigorous.
This Section begins by reviewing the leading empirical studies
on economic effects of tort law.
A. STUDIES OF TORT REFORM
A movement to reform tort law, generally in a prodefendant direction, began in the 1980s and continues to this
day.114 Some have sought to assess the effects of tort law by examining the before and after effects of tort reform, typically
with respect to the operation of the legal system. Thus, placing
caps on noneconomic damages was associated with reduced litigation115 and reduced damage awards.116 A variety of reforms
had the effect of reducing general liability losses.117 However,
these studies do not directly measure the overall economic effects of tort reform.
Some have analyzed the general economic effects of tort
reform, including medical malpractice and its effect on the
113. John N. Frank, Do Legal Costs Really Drive Up the Cost of Doing
Business in North America? And Is This the Year That All Changes?, FORWARD ONLINE (May/June 2004), http://forward.msci.org/articles/0605tort.cfm
(discussing HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2005 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 13 (2005)).
114. For a summary of tort reform efforts and their consequences, see generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES (2004).
115. Mark J. Browne & Robert Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, 18 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 189, 190–91 (1999).
116. See Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical
Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
199, 203 (2001) (finding that average recovery by plaintiffs decreased after
medical malpractice damage caps were implemented).
117. Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 103, at 272, 274; W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort
Reform Legislation on General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165, 176–80 (1993).
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medical profession or insurance.118 Other early research considered the effect of liability reforms on state labor productivity.119 The authors found a dramatic effect, with states that
adopted tort reform having significantly greater increases in
aggregate labor productivity.
The study‘s simple definition of labor productivity (gross
state product divided by employment) may be unreliable. Various other factors can influence labor productivity, including the
composition of business for a particular state. The authors considered effects in different industry sectors, but the results
were rather mixed—in some cases increased liability was associated with significant productivity increases, in others not.120
The authors controlled for political and interest group factors,121 but a vast number of possible third factors were not
controlled for and may well explain the results. The authors
acknowledged a possible endogeneity bias (that tort reform correlated with unobserved determinants of productivity) but had
no means to test this effect.122 Moreover, while labor productivity is a very important economic factor, the study did not measure the externalities from liability reform and largely misses
the economic benefits (i.e. deterrence) of tort liability.
Another study sought to measure the benefits of tort law
through accident reduction, but hypothesized that excessive
tort law could increase accidents by discouraging innovative
and beneficial products.123 The authors measured the effects of
tort reforms such as limits on punitive and noneconomic damages, provision for prejudgment interest, collateral source
rules, and joint and several liability on states‘ accidental, non-

118. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, J.L. ECON & ORG. (forthcoming),
available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/12/30/jleo.ewq017.full
.pdf (finding that certain tort reforms reduced insurance premiums slightly, by
one to two percent).
119. Thomas J. Campbell et al., The Link Between Liability Reforms and
Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, at 107, 108.
120. Id. at 126–29.
121. Id. at 127.
122. Id. at 133.
123. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221, 235–36 (2007). This hypothesis is grounded in
other research showing that there is an optimal level of tort law for innovation
and that excess tort liability may reduce beneficial product safety innovation.
Viscusi & Moore, supra note 94.

2011]

ECONOMICS OF TORT REFORM

49

motor vehicle death rates.124 They found that some tort reforms
(such as damage caps) had the effect of reducing accident rates,
though other reforms (reforms related to product liability and
one type of collateral source reform, admit evidence) were associated with increases.125 Overall, states with tort reforms generally had greater decreases in accident rates than those without such reforms and the authors estimated that the net effect
of tort reform was to save approximately 24,000 lives.126 While
this study did not measure economic effects, it struck at the
very economic purpose of tort law—to deter causing accidents.
One of the authors, though, subsequently reached different
conclusions when examining malpractice laws. She found that
caps on total damages and collateral source reforms were associated with an increase in deaths.127 In addition, the migration
of doctors to reform states may have increased deaths in neighboring states, and the reforms disproportionately harmed women.128 Much like the general studies on the deterrent effect of
tort law, the result of research on tort reform effects is ambiguous. While the authors sought to control for other determinants of death rates, they could consider only a few, and many
uncontrolled third variables may have been the true explanation of the results.
As a general rule, studies of tort reform have significant
limitations because they do not consider the baseline level of
tort law that is being reformed. This may produce selection bias
and endogeneity problems. Suppose that there is some optimally efficient state of tort law (say at 0.5). States with more proplaintiff tort law systems (say at 0.75) that adopt pro-defendant
reforms should show economic benefits. However, a state with
more pro-defendant baseline tort law (say at 0.25) that adopted
similar pro-defendant reforms would not show these benefits,
because it would be moving further away from the optimum.
Thus, a study of reform without considering the baseline tort
law reformed may produce distorted results.
Consider how a focus on tort reform legislation might yield
misleading results in the tort context. It is plausible that more
pro-plaintiff states, with inefficient baseline law, are more likely to adopt tort reforms. Because these states begin with a
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Rubin & Shepard, supra note 123, at 229.
Id.
Id. at 235.
See Shepherd, supra note 14, at 970.
Id.
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baseline that is excessive, those reforms should tend to show
positive effects. But the positive effect comes not from the content of the reforms themselves so much as from the shift in the
underlying baseline. One could not necessarily expect other
states, with a baseline tort law that is more pro-defendant, to
gain positive results from further tort reforms. Similarly, the
association between tort reform and reduced accidental deaths
might be an artifact of the states that adopted tort reform being
those where such action was beneficial.
This is evident from the study of the effect of tort reform
measures on labor productivity.129 Reforms that decreased liability had a very positive, statistically significant, effect on labor productivity in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector.130 However, the study found that reforms that increased
liability also had a (slightly less) positive, statistically significant effect on labor productivity in this sector.131 While this
might be attributable to mere random noise, it also might show
an efficient selection effect—those states were moving their
baseline law in the direction of optimality.
This possible selection effect bias is but one example of how
studies of tort reform may be skewed. Research on costs shows
that the states most likely to adopt medical malpractice tort
reform are also those with managed care,132 so that the results
may not simply be attributable to the tort reform but instead to
a third factor, or a third factor combined with tort reform. Consequently, the baseline level of tort liability law must be examined.
While the studies of tort reform provide us with some information, the selection effect problems mean that they have
significant limitations in describing the economic effects of tort
law. It is the baseline overall status of tort law that must be
evaluated economically. I move on to undertake such a test, using the Chamber of Commerce and PRI measures of interstate
differences in tort law. The following Section presents my analysis of these scales on various economic measures.

129. Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 127.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of
Medical Malpractice Liability 3 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,383, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478801.
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B. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TORT LAW
As discussed above, some have studied the effect of tort law
on economic variables, such as innovation.133 Other research on
individual products found that lessened liability tends to reduce product prices.134 There is little rigorous evidence, though,
on the overall economic effect of different tort liability standards.
Some existing research, though not peer reviewed, has
gone beyond the tort reform context and sought to examine the
effects of baseline tort standards, using the PRI and Chamber
of Commerce measures. These studies will be discussed in more
depth later in this paper. A PRI study found that states with
better rankings on their measure of tort law had better state
gross domestic product growth, labor earnings growth and tax
revenue increases.135
Another study used the Chamber of Commerce index and
found that higher rankings on that scale were associated with
better state per capita economic growth.136 This brief study
considered only state growth rates from 1995 to 1999.137 The
research contained no control variables whatsoever to account
for possible third factors and its results are therefore quite tentative.
This existing research is relatively crude and conducted by
conservative or business groups devoted to reducing tort liability. A liberal, anti-tort reform group has conducted its own research and found no association between tort costs and factors
such as innovation and productivity.138 This analysis was likewise crude, though, and may also have been infected by the bias of the researchers.

133. See Viscusi & Moore, supra note 94.
134. See, e.g., Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the
Market for Childhood Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994); Richard L.
Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the
United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203, 234 (1997).
135. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, PAC. RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2006 REPORT 71–77 (2006), available
at http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/2006_Tort_Index.pdf.
136. TODD G. BUCHHOLZ & ROBERT W. HAHN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, DOES A STATE‘S LEGAL FRAMEWORK AFFECT ITS ECONOMY? 4 –5
(2002), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?
id=1018.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 10.
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International evaluations are complicated by substantial
differences among nations (other than tort litigation). The role
of government in these countries differs, as do their cultures.139
Moreover, reliable international data on litigation is quite limited. Consequently, cross-national research offers less promise for assessing the economic effects of tort litigation.
The American states offer greater promise as a laboratory
for a general study of the effects of tort law. While there are
various cultural and other differences among the states, they
are surely more similar than different nations and are part of a
single market, with little restriction on interstate commerce. A
great deal of data is available on the states for use in an empirical analysis. The most uncertain data is on the state of different tort liability systems, and I use both the Chamber and PRI
measures in this analysis.
It has been argued that ―[m]uch of what we think we know
about the behavior of the tort litigation system is untrue, unknown, or unknowable.‖140 Since this time, though, additional
information has become available, such as the Chamber and
PRI studies, which enable us to understand more. While I
would not purport to have ascertained the final answers, this
research may illuminate the effects of tort law on economic
matters of interest.
III. THE MEASURES OF TORT LAW USED IN THIS STUDY
Quantitatively evaluating the effect of tort law on the
economy requires some measure of the state of tort law. The
United States provides the states as a laboratory—while our
states share much tort law in common, they also have distinctive differences. History has seen some dramatic differences in
state tort law (e.g., comparative vs. contributory negligence,
strict product liability). Today, the differences in state tort law
are not so great, but material differences remain, and they
139. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the
United States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. &
SOC‘Y 400, 400 (1991) (suggesting that different litigation practices in these
nations ―reflect fundamental cultural perspectives‖).
140. Saks, supra note 12, at 1149; see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature
and Impact of the ―Tort Reform‖ Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 476–77
(2006) (suggesting that ―because of the limitations on the available data concerning the operation of the tort system and the effect of reforms, there is no
way to be sure whether the tort system hinders innovation, competitiveness, or
access to healthcare, whether it provides an improper level of incentives for
safety, or whether tort reform will reduce any undesirable effects‖).
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have been considered significant. To conduct an empirical study
of such differences requires some quantitative measure, and at
least two are available and will now be summarized.
A. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
In 2002, the United States Chamber of Commerce began
publishing a survey evaluating state tort law systems, which
has become the best-known rating system for tort law.141 The
Chamber employed Harris Interactive to conduct telephone interviews of a ―nationally representative sample of in-house
general counsel, senior litigators and other senior attorneys
who are knowledgeable about litigation matters at companies
with annual revenues of at least $100 million.‖142 Of the 957
respondents, only 6% were from insurance companies.143 The
survey is not limited to tort litigation but also considers contract law.144
The survey respondents were asked to give grades ranging
from ―A‖ to ―F‖ on twelve topics. The issues rated for each state
were145:
 Having and enforcing meaningful venue requirements,
 Overall treatment of tort and contract litigation,
 Treatment of class action suits and mass consolidation
suits,
 Punitive damages,
 Timeliness of summary judgment or dismissal,
 Discovery,
 Scientific and technical evidence,
 Non-economic damages,
 Judges‘ impartiality,
 Judges‘ competence,
 Juries‘ predictability, and
 Juries‘ fairness.
The respondents‘ assessments are then cumulated to provide a
mean grade for each category and the mean grades are averaged to provide an overall state grade.146
141. Here, I analyze the 2008 study. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2008 U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY (2008).
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
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The topics are not ideal for a study of tort law. While some
seem largely focused on tort issues (punitive damages, noneconomic damages), others are much broader (e.g., assessing
the quality of judges across the board). In addition the ―overall
treatment‖ category would seem to take account of other categories, yet they are all added together and given equal weight
for an overall score.147
The Chamber of Commerce ratings of tort law have been
criticized by Theodore Eisenberg.148 He complains that the
Chamber‘s survey reflects a biased sample, because it reflects
only the views of those on the business side of litigation.149 He
also identifies an apparent correlation between ratings and
state population.150 Another potential bias arises from the fact
that the survey‘s respondents were provided with the results
from preceding years.151 Eisenberg proceeds to demonstrate the
apparent inaccuracy of the ratings on particular legal measures, such as punitive damages and class action treatment.152
The high intercorrelation of state assessments on different legal measures suggests to him that some underlying ―latent‖
factor explains the relative ratings of the states.153 In response
to these criticisms, a representative of the survey company explained that the goal of the research was to measure perception, not the actual state of the law, and the negative effects of
tort liability may primarily be the result of perceptions.154
While the perception defense has some value, it undermines the true test of tort law, insofar as the rating may not reflect actual change in the laws. Alabama, for example, has seen
147. Id.
148. Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969
(2009).
149. Id. at 974 –75.
150. Id. at 995–97. While Eisenberg suggests this is a reflection of the frequency of litigation, id., it is also plausible that larger states may have features that produce more pro-plaintiff law.
151. Id. at 977.
152. Id. at 982–87.
153. Id. at 988–92.
154. See GARY L. GITTINGS & JOHN W. BAGBY, MANAGING PRODUCT LIABILITY TO ACHIEVE HIGHWAY INNOVATIONS 4 (Nat‘l Coop. Highway Research Program, Synthesis of Highway Practice No. 265, 1998) (suggesting that
―[ p]erception versus reality of product liability [is] a barrier to innovation‖);
Alan S. Miller & Lawrence R. Holzman, Products Liability and Associated
Perceptions of Risk, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENVIRON. 347, 353 (1994) (noting
that ―current perceptions of products-liability risk ‗chills‘ innovation in technological endeavors‖).
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a significant change in its tort law regime, without a corresponding shift in Chamber of Commerce evaluations.155 This
suggests that actual tort law rules do not drive perceptions as
measured by the survey, which would undermine any argument for changing actual rules. However, it is also possible that
it takes time for perceptions to change. Businesses may wait to
see how new legal rules influence trial practice before changing
their impression of a state‘s tort environment.
The overall impact of Eisenberg‘s criticisms is uncertain.
There is no reason to think respondents are biased between
states. Moreover, business perceptions of state law could be the
more accurate reflection of the effect of tort law in a given
state.156 Judges are very deferential to jury verdicts, and judges
themselves may apply the law differently for ideological or other reasons. Finally, the existence of an underlying factor does
not undermine the validity of the test—in fact, such a factor is
precisely what we are talking about when we discuss the effects
of tort law on the economy.
One study using the Chamber of Commerce measures provides some empirical evidence for its accuracy.157 The authors
used the scale as a variable to predict automobile liability expenses.158 If there were no correlation between the Chamber‘s
score and reality, there should be no correlation between the
score and liability expense. Yet the study found a significant
association between the Chamber‘s score and the two proxies
used for automobile liability costs: premiums for automobile
liability insurance per vehicle and automobile liability losses
and loss adjustment expenses incurred per vehicle.159 The authors found that if the liability environments in all states were
at the level of the Chamber‘s top scoring state (Delaware),
there would be a total savings of nearly $23 billion.160
155. Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 994 –95. Indeed, a review of rankings
over the years since 2002 shows a high level of intertemporal consistency (Delaware was ranked first every year), though some states show significant variation. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 96.
156. Daniel Kessler, Fault, Settlement, and Negligence Law, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 296, 296 (1995). The study concluded that the ―letter of the law may be
less important in shaping individual‘s behavior than scholars have supposed.‖
Id. at 309.
157. Robert E. Hoyt & Lawrence S. Powell, The Effect of Liability Environment on Tort System Costs: Evidence from Automobile Insurance (Sept.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808404.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id. at 14 –18.
160. Id. at 19.
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The results of this study give some assurance that the
Chamber‘s measure captures something about the state‘s tort
liability system, even if its measures for individual variables
were considered unreliable. Others have expressed confidence
in the Chamber‘s ―ability to measure the quality of courts‖ as
well.161 Perhaps the individual measures are not entirely accurate, but the overall measure may capture some latent feature
of the state‘s judicial system that is either pro-plaintiff or prodefendant. While this finding may limit the value of the scale
for tort reform purposes, it can still be used for assessing the
effect of the system on the economy. If the perceptions appeared to have a significant economic effect, independent of the
content of the law itself, a state would certainly want to explore
ways to change those perceptions.
B. PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
A second index of different state tort liability systems was
prepared by Pacific Research Institute (PRI).162 In contrast to
the survey approach of the Chamber of Commerce, PRI attempted to measure the actual law of each state on twentyeight separate measures, not merely perceptions of the law.163
These measures include164:
 Existence of a cap on appeal bonds,
 Existence of caps on non-economic damages (excluding
medical-malpractice lawsuits),
 Existence of caps on punitive damages (excluding medical-malpractice lawsuits),
 Caps on damage awards in medical-malpractice lawsuits
 Nature of class-action rules,
 Existence of attorney contingency-fee limits (excluding
medical-malpractice lawsuits),
 Use of contributory, comparative, or modified-comparative
standard for plaintiff‘s negligence,
 Nature of rules on joint and several liability,
 Nature of rules on early offers of settlement,

161. E.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 399,
413 (2006).
162. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31.
163. Id. at 3.
164. Id. at 24.
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 Existence of an ―Illinois Brick repealer‖ statute for antitrust litigation,165
 Existence of attorney-retention sunshine rules for state
litigation,
 Reforms of collateral source rule,
 Nature of jury service rules,
 Existence of attorney-fee limits in medical malpractice
cases,
 Pre-trial screening or arbitration in medical malpractice
cases,
 Asbestos- and silica-liability rules,
 Construction liability rules,
 Existence of an FDA or FTC compliance defense,
 Retailer and manufacturer product liability rules,
 Exemptions for junk food or obesity claims,
 Appointment or election of state supreme court justices,
 Existence of a ―harmful‖ attorney general,
 Nature of venue rules,
 Standards for expert witnesses,
 Conditions for expert witnesses in medical-malpractice
litigation,
 Statute of limitations for medical-malpractice litigation,
 Size of juries and majority requirements, and
 Existence of a complex litigation court.
This index is focused more specifically on torts than the
Chamber of Commerce measure, but does include some measures related to statutory enforcement or litigation more broadly.166 The list of topics measured is quite extensive but some are
rather narrow (e.g., availability of junk food lawsuits). The correlation among the different scores is quite low, in contrast to
the Chamber survey.167
The choice of some variables in the PRI list is questionable.
For example, PRI assumes that the existence of a separate
court for complex litigation is pro-defendant, but this could be
165. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers can sue for damages arising from antitrust violations. 431
U.S. 720, 746 (1977). Most states have passed laws, called ―Illinois Brick repealers,‖ that allow other victims to sue as well. Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of
Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 447– 48 (2010).
166. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 24.
167. Id. at 40– 45.
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disputed.168 PRI also prefers appointment to the election of
state supreme court judges, but the effect of this process is by
no means certain.169 Presumably, these factors are based upon
the perceptions of which legal variables are significant to business and in many cases the PRI variable was grounded in some
research on the relevance of the particular variable to economic
consequences.170
PRI cumulates its legal scores into what it calls an input
ranking of the overall state of a state‘s tort law.171 The twentyeight separate variables were ranked among the states, and an
average ranking was produced for the input index, giving each
variable equal weight.172 This is of course questionable, as the
effect of each variable is not the same. The numeric scores were
also treated as linear differentials, though this may be inaccurate. In addition, the numeric scaling of each particular variable was necessarily arbitrary,173 which is compounded by the
168. There is a theory that a specialized business court, characterized by
PRI as a complex litigation court, would ―attract top-notch judges, with expertise and sensitivity to business issues‖ or that such a court would ―lead to
more predictable, consistent and prudent‖ results. Ember Reichgott Junge,
Business Courts: Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 315, 317 (1998). However, this has not been demonstrated by rigorous
study, and the effect of such courts is ―unproven.‖ Id. at 318. If these courts
were preferable to companies, one might expect that they would diminish reliance on arbitration clauses, but this does not appear to be the case. See
Christopher Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Litigation, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 492 (2009).
169. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 196 (2003) (studying declarations of unconstitutionality and finding some effect of the merit plan selection system but not
other forms of judicial selection); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat,
What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25,
39 (1979) (finding little variation in judiciaries by selection method). There are
various forms of appointment and elections (partisan or nonpartisan) among
the states. The simple binary division may be misleading. And the conclusions
favoring appointment can also be questioned. For example, merit plan selection methods (a form of appointment) have been linked to more appellate litigation. F. Andrew Hanssen, On the Politics of Judicial Selection: Lawyers and
State Campaigns for the Merit Plan, 110 PUB. CHOICE 79, 80 (2002). Elections,
conversely, may be used by business groups to turn tort law in a more prodefendant direction, as occurred in Texas. See Anthony Champagne, Tort
Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1483–84 (2005) (discussing success in reversing pro-plaintiff Texas law).
170. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 23.
171. Id. at 40– 45.
172. Id. at 39.
173. The rankings were between 1 and 50, but varied depending on the
number of discernible gradations for the measure. Id. If the researchers could
divide the states into three categories, they received numeric ratings of 1, 25.5,
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cumulation of the numeric scores, but the overall figures may
generally reflect the tort system of a state.
C. COMPARING THE SCALES
Both the Chamber of Commerce and PRI studies attempt
to measure the characteristics of the states‘ laws and the degree to which they favor plaintiffs, and are often taken as evidence of the relative state liability regimes.174 The Chamber
and PRI scales, based respectively on perception and description of legal content, are also readily comparable. The association of states on the Chamber‘s overall measure and the PRI‘s
input score scales is displayed in Figure 1. The metrics differ in
that a lower score is better on the PRI scale but worse on the
Chamber‘s scale. If they correlated as expected, one would see a
line slanting downward from the upper-left to the lower-right of
the graph.
Figure 1
Comparative Tort Liability Scores

and 50. If they were divided into five categories, the states would be rated at 1,
13.25, 25.5, 37.75, and 50. See id. Of course, there was no attempt to determine if the difference between 1 and 13.25 was equivalent to the difference
between 37.75 and 50. See id.
174. Id. at 1; HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 6.
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There is no obvious association between the two metrics.
The reasonably large number of data points in the upper-right
quadrant of the graph represents states that the Chamber of
Commerce considers relatively good on tort law but PRI grades
as relatively bad. Illinois, for example, ranks forty-sixth on the
PRI scale (fifth-worst state), but ranks fifth-best on the Chamber of Commerce measure. Large disparities also exist for other
states. The highest level of agreement is probably for Louisiana, which ties for the worst state on the Chamber measure
and is the eighth-worst state according to PRI.
One possible explanation for the lack of association is the
simple fact that they do not purport to measure the same thing.
The Chamber measures perceptions,175 while PRI measures legal content.176 Moreover, they do not even measure the same
legal dimensions. A few broad issues, including general legal
quality, are measured in the Chamber study,177 while PRI
measures numerous, often quite specific, legal doctrines.178
Comparing the ratings for expert evidence between the two
scales is informative. PRI measures the standard for admissibility of expert witnesses with a scale including use of the more
rigorous Daubert standard.179 The Chamber measured perceptions of the state‘s standards for scientific and technical evidence,180 which is vague but seems similar to the PRI standard.
Figure 2 presents the state scores on the two measures. A true
correlation should show a downwards slanting line.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144– 47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 36–37.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2
Comparative Expert Evidence Scores

Both scales purport to measure roughly the same thing. A
regression of the two shows no significant association between
the measures. Further exploration reveals that the one PRI variable that has the strongest expected statistically significant
relationship with the Chamber‘s overall measure was the election of state supreme court justices, not any of the specific doctrinal measures. The lack of correlation for the two measures is
surely troubling.
Given the lack of association between the two measures of
tort law, it may be that measured business perceptions do not
reflect the substance of the state‘s law. It seems reasonable to
assume that if tort law is indeed important to business success
the two would be highly correlated. Perhaps some states have
done effective public relations work and fooled businesses about
the nature of their tort system. Or perhaps one (or both) of the
measures is simply inaccurate (such as suggested by Eisenberg‘s evaluation of the Chamber of Commerce study). It is also
possible that PRI‘s measures of actual legal content missed the
issues that businesses consider truly important as assessed by
the Chamber‘s survey of business perceptions. In this research,
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I will use both measures to examine economic effects of tort
law.181
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE
TORT LAW
This Part presents my empirical assessment of the economic effects of tort law in the United States, using the Chamber
and PRI measures. Evaluating the economic effect of tort law is
difficult. For one thing, which variables most accurately demonstrate the effects of tort law on the economy is far from clear.
One must also control for third variables that may prove the
true determinant of state economic measures.
One additional problem with state law comparisons involves spillover effects. The laws of a given state will affect
practices in other states. A national enterprise must consider
the laws of all states in its manufacturing and production decisions. A plaintiff might arise from any state, and the opportunity for plaintiff forum shopping allows litigation to focus on the
most pro-plaintiff jurisdiction. While in theory such an enterprise may forego participation in a given state, doing so necessarily involves sacrificing a great deal of business. Thus, differences in state law may not matter so much if, for example, each
business must adapt to the content of the strictest state law.
While this spillover effect does not entirely undermine interstate comparisons, it mutes their relative effects. State courts
may even discriminate against out-of-state defendants.182 Practically speaking, this spillover effect means that any discovered
differences are probably understatements of the true economic
effects of tort law.
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The object of this study is to test the effect of tort law,
which requires some measure of the state of tort law in a state.
There is no one conclusive measure, so I will employ several,
discussed below. I also control for various other factors that
181. In its 2006 report, PRI suggested that the ―two rankings are best
viewed as complements.‖ MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 135, at 53.
182. See, e.g., Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, Exporting Tort
Awards, 23 REG., no. 2, 2000 at 21, 23–26 (finding that states tend to impose
higher liability on out-of-state defendants). At least for elected state judiciaries, the ―ability to transfer vast amounts of wealth from out-of-state corporations may be the crucial factor driving the tort law crisis.‖ Zywicki, supra note
45, at 15.
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may be correlated with the dependent variables of interest and
the tort law variables such as quality of states‘ court systems,
population, and urbanization. The available data is for one year
(2008), so a standard OLS cross-sectional regression method is
used in the study. The regression takes the form:
Y = B + BiI + BnN + u
Where Y is the dependent variable of interest, B is the constant, I is the measure of tort law (Chamber or PRI), N represents all the additional control variables used in the equation, and u is a random disturbance term.
1. Tort Variables
The Chamber of Commerce‘s overall measure and the PRI
input measure are designed to capture the full scope of a state‘s
tort law and the degree to which it may be pro-plaintiff. They
are obvious independent variables for use in this research.
However, as discussed above, both scales are imperfect for this
test. The Chamber measure is a test only of perceptions and
has been questioned for its reliability.183 The PRI measure is of
the actual legal rules of the state but it cannot address all the
tort rules of the state. Some of the rules comprising the measure may not be the important ones, while other important rules
may have been omitted. PRI did not select the measured rules
randomly, though, and the chosen rules were those considered
to be salient by ―legal experts, university professors, and lawyers.‖184
While neither the Chamber nor the PRI measures are perfect scales for the effects of tort law, they are the best available
and provide reasonable measures. The Chamber‘s measure of
business perceptions should reflect how business assesses tort
law, which influences business decision making. The PRI‘s
measure of actual tort doctrines is an even more direct measure
of the composition of a state‘s tort regime.

183. See Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 1001–02.
184. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 2. Accompanied by an
―exhaustive search of the academic-journal literature,‖ as well as state tortreform actions, PRI recognized that the variables were not exhaustive and
suggested variables for some where it could not obtain data. Id. at 11.
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2. Control Variables
There are also separate factors, other than tort liability,
that must be considered as control variables. Many factors influence state economic welfare and it is a daunting task to isolate those. If these additional variables tend to correlate with
the tort variables of interest in this study, they may create a
spurious association. In this Section I identify several general
control variables that might plausibly skew associations between tort liability and general economic measures.
One variable is the quality of the court system itself. Berkowitz and Clay have found that the states settled by civil law
nations had lower quality courts and less independent judiciaries.185 To control for this possible effect, I create a binary variable for whether the state was civil law or common law in
origin.
Another relevant external control variable is urbanization,
the percent of a state‘s population that lives in cities. Such
proximate living is likely to produce more torts and more tort
litigation.186 The greater litigation may have an effect on the
content of tort law. One study found that urbanization was
strongly correlated with ―earlier adoptions of the tort innovations‖ studied, due to more opportunities to shape the law.187
Those in urban areas may be ―particularly affected by the high
costs of the tort system.‖188 In addition, one would expect urbanization to be associated with our economic dependent variables, so it is used as a control variable.
185. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62, 65, 68 tbl.1 (2005);
Berkowitz & Clay, supra note 161, 416–31 (2006).
186. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of
Tort Suits Across U.S. States and Between the United States and England, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 480 (1997) (noting that suits are ―more likely in an urban
setting‖ because the ―parties to accidents are more likely to be strangers‖ and
because ―lawyers are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas‖); HanDuck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of
Tort Filings? Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295, 303 (1994)
(providing additional reasons why urbanization would be ―positively correlated
with the rate of tort filings‖). There is a clear positive association of urbanization and the frequency of medical malpractice claims. Patricia Danzon, The
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & ECON. 115,
143 (1984).
187. James M. Lutz, Regional Leaders in the Diffusion of Tort Innovations
Among the American States, 27 PUBLIUS 39, 42 (1997).
188. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 104TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM 1 (Comm.
Print 1996), reprinted at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/tort/tort.htm.
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Another control variable to consider is the role of other
branches of state government. As noted above, tort law may
have a smaller role in Europe simply because its function is assumed by legislative or executive branches. Consequently, what
appears to be a more pro-defendant approach to tort law may
be the result of a larger legislative or executive role in protecting accident victims. In the United States, however, prodefendant tort law appears to correlate with other governmental economic freedom protections.189 If so, this association could
distort analysis—the apparent economic effects of tort law
might truly be those of other economic freedoms. To test this
effect, I use a measure of government size for each state.190
The state‘s ideology may also be relevant to the results.
One might expect that more liberal ideological states would
have a more pro-plaintiff set of tort law rules and they may
well have juries who are more sympathetic to plaintiffs. Yet
such states would also be expected to have more anti-business
regulatory policies as well. Suppose the research found that
more pro-plaintiff tort law was associated with less economic
growth. If pro-plaintiff states also had more business regulation, that effect might actually be due to the greater regulation,
not the tort laws. Hence, a control for ideology is necessary. I
use the percent of popular vote in each state won by President
Obama in the most recent presidential election.191
Yet another important variable is the state‘s level of human capital. More educated populations are conducive to economic growth. This measure has been widely used in international research, where educational investments have been a
major determinant of future economic growth.192 One study
found that the growth in years of schooling in the United States
explained about 25% of the nation‘s growth of per capita income
for much of the twentieth century.193 The ―evidence is ‗now
quite strong of a close link between investments in human capi-

189. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 135, at 56.
190. The data for this measure comes from AMELA KARABEGOVIĆ & FRED
MCMAHON, THE FRASER INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF NORTH AMERICA:
2008 ANNUAL REPORT (US EDITION) 64 tbl.3.5, 66 tbl.3.6 (2008).
191. Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, http://elections.nytimes
.com/2008/results/president/votes.html.
192. Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106
Q.J. ECON. 407, 412 (1991).
193. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH,
1929–1982, at 15–16 (1985).
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tal and growth.‘‖194 Research has confirmed this effect on a
state-by-state basis.195 There are various ways to assess relative human capital, but for this study, I use a measure of the
percentage of a state‘s population that has attained a Bachelor‘s or more advanced degree.196
Another control variable involves a state‘s relative economic reliance on manufacturing. Industrial composition may influence growth rates, and different states are more or less dependent on manufacturing, as opposed to services.197 Similarly,
undue reliance on any sector may affect growth rates as economies change.198
A final variable of concern is the state‘s social capital, a sociological concept that involves the interconnectedness of individual‘s in a society.199 The concept obtained some notoriety
with the publication of Richard Putnam‘s Bowling Alone, which
stressed the significance of social capital for a successful society
and lamented its decline in this nation.200 There is also a
―widespread consensus‖ that social capital can ―promote economic progress.‖201 The consensus is backed by international

194. Gary S. Becker et al., Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic
Growth, 98 J. POL. ECON. S12, S13 (1990).
195. See Gerald A. Carlino & Richard Voith, Accounting for Differences in
Aggregate State Productivity, 22 REGIONAL. SCI. & URB. ECON. 597, 616 (1992)
(finding a significant role for human capital on state productivity differentials); Gasper A. Garofalo & Steven Yamarik, Regional Convergence: Evidence
from a New State-by-State Capital Stock Series, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 316,
316 (2002) (finding a significant role for human capital on state growth).
196. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2011, at 151 tbl.229 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab /
2011/tables/11s0229.pdf.
197. For an example of the significance of this variable, see W. Robert
Reed, The Determinants of U.S. State Economic Growth: A Less Extreme
Bounds Analysis, 47 ECON. INQUIRY 685 (2009).
198. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126,
1150 (1992) (reporting value of diversification).
199. For a summary of the concept, see Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its
Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3–6
(1998). The concept is somewhat vague, but has been called ―the social glue
that produces cohesion‖ and ―also a set of cognitive aptitudes and predispositions.‖ Joseph E. Stiglitz, Formal and Informal Institutions, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 59, 60 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000).
200. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE passim (2000).
201. Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL:
A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra note 199, at 3; see also PUTNAM, supra
note 200, at 319–20 (providing evidence of the relationship).
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empirical research.202 Each of the following regressions will
employ these control variables. While many other variables
could affect state economic growth, the number of cases to be
studied is necessarily limited to fifty, so parsimony in independent variables is required.
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The next question involves the economic measures that
should be used to test the effects of tort law. While the ultimate
concern is overall economic welfare, such a broad measure is
more subject to confounding outside variables, so I also analyze
other categories. Ideally, the overall economic results should be
bolstered by more specific economic measures, which would
suggest the pathway through which the overall results occur.
I begin by examining the costs of several types of insurance
against tort liability, which should identify the true costs of a
tort system. I then consider the associations of tort law on
overall economic success of the states and on particular economic variables (such as productivity and foreign direct investment). Finally, I evaluate effects on measures of entrepreneurship, where interstate tort differences should reveal their
most profound effects.
1. Insurance Costs
Tort liability supposedly hurts the economy through unwarranted liability awards, forcing people and companies to
bear undue costs, which cannot be put to more efficient ends,
and perhaps to forego introducing valuable new products.
Hence, if the expected harm is occurring, this should appear in
the form of higher liability costs. There is no comprehensive
measure of cumulative liability awards in a state and, even if
there were, much of the cost would be found in private settlements.203 While there is no good measure for actual liability, a
good proxy could be found in insurance costs. Studies have
202. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an
Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1251
(1997); Stephen Knack, Social Capital, Growth, and Poverty: A Survey of
Cross-Country Evidence, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 42, 44 – 45 (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van
Bastelaer eds., 2002); Paul F. Whitely, Economic Growth and Social Capital,
48 POL. STUD. 443, 460 (2000).
203. See Huber & Litan, supra note 3, at 1 (observing that ―most cases are
settled, and the settlements, which are much more difficult to monitor and aggregate than verdicts, are far more numerous and consequential overall‖).
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found that certain tort reform measures decrease insurers‘ liability losses.204
The PRI report assessing the state of tort law also contains
ecological data on insurance rates. The data comes from A.M.
Best Company and purports to be ―the gold standard because
they are subject to audit and are reviewed by state insurance
regulatory agencies.‖205 Data is available on nine lines of insurance, plus categories of self-insurance. Losses were divided by
gross state product to permit comparisons per capita. Because
the measure is insurance losses, it includes payments in settlements as well as court awards.
Comparing insurance costs is not a perfect test for liability
effects. In addition to the control variables discussed above,
many other variables influence insurance costs. Each state has
its own system of insurance regulation (and its own set of judicial decisions, typically contract law based) on the obligations of
insurers. As a result, policy language may differ by state and
this could have an effect on losses, separate from the tort liability system. There are also other measures for the insurance
costs in states, including premium rates. These other measures,
however, are more likely to be distorted by different state regulatory systems (which in some cases set premiums). Moreover,
they may be affected by unrelated factors that influence insurance company profits.206
Liability losses, though imperfect, may be the best available measure for tort costs. To the extent that the loss data is
skewed, this fact is likely to obscure a statistically significant
relationship and produce a false negative.207 Consequently, a
statistically significant finding would be strong evidence. However, as with any statistical study, failing to reject a null hypothesis of no effect is not actually strong evidence of no causal
effect.
204. E.g., Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, Insurance Market Responses to the
1980s Liability Reforms: An Analysis of Firm-Level Data, 61 J. RISK & INS. 192,
193 (1994); Robert E. Hoyt et al., The Relation Between Tort Law Environment
and Automobile Insurance Costs, 2007 AMERICAN RISK AND INSURANCE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING (July 31, 2007 ), http://www.aria.org/meetings/2007%
20presentations/HOYT%20POWELL%20STITH%208-03-2007.pdf.
205. MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 31, at 13.
206. See, e.g., Chimerine & Eisenbrey, supra note 71, at 2 (contending that
insurance premiums are affected by other variables such as investment success in the market, interest rates, and rising costs, such as for medical care).
207. See Frank B. Cross, Perhaps We Should Pay Federal Circuit Judges
More, 88 B.U. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (2008) (discussing this effect).

2011]

ECONOMICS OF TORT REFORM

69

PRI categorizes data on insurance costs by different segments, including automobile, farm owners, commercial general
liability (CGL), other, homeowners, medical malpractice, product liability, personal and commercial self-insurance, as well as
an overall insurance cost score. For this research, I will use as
dependent variables the overall measure, the CGL insurance
measure (a form of coverage that broadly includes torts of many
types), and the product liability insurance costs. The effect of
tort law on business should be especially apparent in the latter
two categories.
I use a two-tailed test that accounts for the possibility that
stricter tort law rules would be economically beneficial. Remember that a lower score is better on the PRI scale but worse
on the Chamber‘s scale. This means that, if tort law produces
higher insurance costs, one would expect a negative sign for the
Chamber measure but a positive sign for the PRI measure. The
following three tables set out the results for my three dependent variable measures of insurance costs, beginning with the
overall measure.
The above models are based on a linear relationship between the independent and the dependent variables. This is a
plausible assumption for this model, more liability associated
with more pro-plaintiff legal doctrine should produce higher insurance costs, even if those costs are economically efficient
ones, which produce societal gain by deterring greater harm.
Table 1 displays the results for both the overall scale of the
Chamber and the cumulative input measure of the PRI scale.
The n for all the tables is 50, the number of states. The Chamber measure is higher for more pro-plaintiff law; the PRI number is lower for more pro-plaintiff law. If results are as hypothesized, the Chamber measure should have a negative sign,
and the PRI‘s a positive sign. Theory would also suggest that
greater urbanization, government size, and liberal ideology
should be associated with higher insurance costs.208 The table
displays coefficients, with t-terms in parentheses and statistically significant associations in bold.

208. I expect urbanization to produce more torts, causing more insurance
liability. Greater government size also would be expected to increase insurance liability (though this might be counteracted by reduced tort liability). I
presume that more liberal states are more likely to impose costs on business
and thus show higher insurance costs.
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Table 1
Effect of Tort Law on Overall Insurance Costs

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Human Capital
Social Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-9.107053
-1.04996
0.04239
1.7056
0.1633
0.2914
0.0424
-0.3041
44.0811
0.3887

PRI
-0.2972
-1.5971
-0.2949
0.6354
0.1852
-2.1926
0.1049
-0.3287
36.7595
0.0656

The results suggest that the Chamber of Commerce measure may correctly capture the state of tort law as it has a highly
statistically significant association with overall insurance costs.
The PRI results do not approach statistical significance, which
is somewhat surprising because the insurance cost measure
was PRI‘s own. The control variables are insignificant in all
tests. Only the Chamber of Commerce measure appeared to be
driving overall insurance costs. This finding must be viewed
with some caution, though, because the Chamber provides a
perceptual measure. Rather than the state of tort law driving
insurance costs, it may be that the relative state insurance
costs drove the perceptions of those the Chamber surveyed.
The overall insurance costs are a broad measure, and a test
of the effect on CGL insurance costs, which are more closely
tied to tort law, may be a better test. The following table reports the same regressions for this dependent variable.
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Table 2
Effect of Tort Law on CGL Insurance Costs

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-17.5343
-10.0102
8.3836
-0.8847
0.3778
-3.1814
-0.0348
-0.4007
105.4663
0.2257

PRI
-0.0108
-10.1679
5.2987
-1.1171
0.3952
-5.7948
0.0279
-0.4675
66.8828
0.1424

None of our measures were statistically significant, though
the Chamber of Commerce measure neared significance in its
expected association with higher insurance costs (p = 0.088).
The results provide only mild confirmation of the Chamber‘s
measure of tort liability law for this insurance cost. I conclude
this Section with the same analysis, but for product liability insurance costs, which also might be associated with state liability standards.
Table 3
Effect of Tort Law on Product Liability Insurance Costs

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
6.3961
4.8687
5.6963
-0.7771
0.3729
-0.3114
-0.1121
-0.9136
15.3693
0.2292

PRI
0.5417
5.7629
6.2336
-0.6242
0.3702
1.6391
-0.2541
-0.8619
8.8852
0.2311
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There is no association with either of our tort law variables
(or any other variable) and the direction of the correlation with
the Chamber score is the opposite of that theorized. The only
variable that approximates statistical significance is reliance
on manufacturing, and it is negative (perhaps reflecting state
protection of local industries). The lack of associations for product liability insurance may seem surprising, given the prominence with which product liability claims are commonly associated with criticisms of tort law. Product liability cases,
though, are but a tiny fraction of overall tort litigation. A
measure of overall tort law may not be a sound proxy for product liability law.
In general, it appears that more pro-defendant tort law as
measured by the Chamber metric may be associated with lower
costs for at least some forms of insurance, but this is not true
for the PRI measure. Even the Chamber measure is not significantly associated with the types of insurance costs typically associated with tort litigation.
While these insurance costs are not our true dependent variable of concern, they are an important intervening variable.
The alleged economic harm due to tort law is typically an assessment of its costs to business, which would show up in the
insurance payment variable. If a measure of tort law is not associated with higher insurance costs, one would be skeptical
that it is the true cause of any negative economic effects that
might be identified. This is not necessarily the case, though.
Suppose fear of liability suppresses business innovation and
creation, which hurts the economy. The absence of innovation,
in this hypothesis, could reduce the insurance costs associated
with pro-plaintiff tort law but would still harm the economy.
However, higher insurance costs are not necessarily an
economic negative. As discussed above, holding responsible
parties liable can be an economically efficient policy, by compelling them to internalize the external costs they impose on others. While higher insurance expenditures would raise the cost
of business, they would encourage better business practices,
which cause less harm to others. It is conceivable that the
greater deterrence could have the effect of reducing insurance
costs, but this presumably would be more than offset by the
lesser liability imposed in a more pro-defendant regime.209
209. Thus, if one imagines a very pro-defendant regime there could be an
enormity of externalized harms, but very little in insurance-liability costs, because defendants would rarely be called upon to assume those costs.
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A final caveat to the insurance cost measure involves the
different composition of business among the states, which may
have some randomness in its operation. Manufacturing is a
control for this, but an imperfect one. Suppose that mining for
coal is inherently risky and accompanied by higher insurance
costs. Some states have coal deposits, while others do not. Of
those states with coal deposits, such mining will surely be a
greater or lesser proportion of their economies. This could skew
the association.210
Perhaps the greatest relevance of these findings goes to the
validity of the Chamber and PRI measures. The PRI measure
does not have the expected correlation. The Chamber measure
does especially well, with very strong associations with overall
and CGL liability costs, although not necessarily to the economy as a whole. The remainder of the Section evaluates the effect of the different systems on economic variables of concern.
2. Overall Economy
Although our central concern is the state of tort law on the
overall economy, broad economic measures may provide the
weakest test of the hypothesis of the effects of tort law. Countless factors affect the quality of a state‘s economy, and they
cannot all be controlled. Even if tort law were having an effect
on the magnitude of a state‘s economy, it may be impossible to
isolate this effect in an empirical study, given all the external
confounding factors. The failure to find a tort law effect would
only mean that torts are not the predominant factor in affecting
state economies, not that tort law has no effect.
This difficulty in finding a true association may be evidenced by international research on economies. A great deal of
economic research has been devoted to identifying the factors
associated with growth among nations, such as free trade,
sound government institutions, and many other factors. While
studies have found associations between such independent variables and economic growth, the results are not consistently
statistically significant across studies using different methodologies or different sets of data.211 The difficulty in finding robust
210. Ideally, one would control for this effect, but given the limited n of the
study (fifty states), it is impossible to introduce all the independent variables
necessary to address the industry composition effect.
211. See Antonio Ciccone & Marek Jarocinski, Determinants of Economic
Growth: Will Data Tell? 1 (European Cent. Bank, ECB Working Paper No.
852, 2009), available at http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/1052.pdf
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associations does not mean that factors such as government institutions or free trade do not influence economic growth (the
null hypothesis), but simply means that various other random
factors obscure the association. This problem should be smaller
for studies of American states, which have many fewer differences than found among different countries, but the difficulty
remains.212 The easy and common migration among states also
means that historic differences should not seriously bias the research. However, the many factors that may influence economic
conditions among the states may make it difficult to find an effect from tort law. To combat this, I employ numerous economic
measures in my search for such an effect.
One would not necessarily expect the relationship of tort
law and the economy to follow a linear relationship. Assume
that there is some optimal tort regime, for economic efficiency
purposes. If the optimal tort regime were more extreme than
that of any state regime (whether pro-plaintiff or prodefendant), the relationship between tort reform and economic
performance should be linear. However, if the optimal state of
the law fell somewhere within the varying state laws, one
would expect the relationship to be quadratic; states with laws
more pro-defendant than the optimal law would suffer economically, as would states with more pro-plaintiff laws. This prospect will be addressed below.
The first variable of interest is per capita state GDP. This
measures the association between state tort liability and state
economic wellbeing. Use of this test contains one major flaw.
The tort variables are available only for 2008, while the state‘s
economy is the result of years of history. One might expect that
the current court liability regimes may resemble the state‘s his(concluding that results are ―very sensitive to minor errors in measurement
and turn out to differ substantially depending on the income estimates being
used‖). An earlier published study found isolated robust effects on economic
growth for the share of investment in GDP and international trade, though
not for other variables. Ross Levine & David Renelt, A Sensitivity Analysis of
Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 942, 959 (1992). Researchers have ―found it easy enough to arrive at significant results‖ simply
because there are so many variables that can be manipulated in this research.
Jessica Cohen & William Easterly, Introduction: Thinking Big Versus Thinking Small, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING
SMALL 1, 3 (Jessica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009).
212. See W. Mark Crain & Katherine J. Lee, Economic Growth Regressions
for the American States: A Sensitivity Analysis, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 242
(1999) (observing that ―while states differ in relevant dimensions, they are not
so different as to make omitted variables an overwhelming source of error‖).
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toric practice, but this need not be the case. The results should
therefore be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Table 4 presents the results of our model for per capita
state GDP, using the same regression equation as in the earlier
analyses. If pro-plaintiff tort law were harming per capita GDP,
we would see a negative association with the PRI score and a
positive association with the Chamber score.
Table 4
Effect of Tort Law on Per Capita GDP

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
1020.034

PRI
230.1302

-19.0764
-2720.231
309.4836
-105.7771
4520.696
252.7209
-46.2566
-16.405.62
0.8218

347.2162
-0.2792
352.2161
-105.2556
5099.3110
198.200
-30.7728
-22,937.87
0.8333

Both measures of tort liability showed no statistical significance, and the PRI measure indicated that more pro-plaintiff
law is associated with higher state per capita GDP. Not much
can be concluded from this, though, because of the prospect of
reverse causality. The strongest associations were with larger
government and more Obama support with higher state GDP.
Yet it seems more likely that richer states were more likely to
vote for President Obama than that voting for President Obama in 2008 caused the state to be richer in 2008.213 The same
is true for government size. The government size correlation
may be that larger government is a superior good; one that
makes up a larger portion of consumption as income rises. As
people grow richer, they may be willing to pay more in taxes for
more government. This also might be true for the PRI measure.
213. In fact, there was a positive correlation among whites between household income and the share of Obama votes. See Razib, The White Vote for Obama, by County & Correlates, GENE EXPRESSION (Nov. 28, 2009, 3:01 PM),
http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2009/11/white-vote-for-obama-by-county.php.
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As states grow richer, they may accept more pro-plaintiff tort
law. Yet the direction of the measure for the Chamber score
was opposite (richer states had relatively more pro-defendant
tort law). The social capital estimates are surprising but may
simply suggest that poorer states are more likely to have this
measure, rather than that social capital hurts the economy.
The effect of tort law might be more likely to appear in per
capita GDP growth rates. The test of tort law on state per capita growth rates requires an additional independent control variable of the pre-existing state per capita GDP. Economists
have demonstrated a process called convergence, under which
poorer jurisdictions will grow faster than richer ones, as they
can take advantage of technological advances developed by
richer states and will often have lower costs for items such as
labor. This is often called the Solow growth model and has been
subjected to extensive review.214 The model has been applied to
individual states in the United States and is applicable.215 Indeed, because of the high level of free trade among American
states, convergence should be stronger domestically than internationally. Hence, prior state GDP is an essential control variable.
The next analysis considers the rate of per capita state
GDP growth for the prior ten years (1998–2008). Ideally, one
would test state tort law systems against future economic
growth, but the data is not available for this; the tort system
measures are only very recent. Considering the prior ten years
should be valid if the tort law system did not change substantially during this time. While states are constantly adjusting
their law, dramatic changes are probably not common. For the
study, I employ the same model as above, with an added variable for per capita state GDP at the beginning of the period.

214. For one example, see Walter Nonneman & Patrick Vanhoudt, A Further Augmentation of the Solow Model and the Empirics of Economic Growth
for OECD Countries, 111 Q.J. ECON. 943 (1996).
215. See Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Convergence Across
States and Regions, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 107,
107–08 (1991); Paul Evans & Georgios Karras, Do Economies Converge? Evidence from a Panel of U.S. States, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 384, 387 (1996).
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Table 5
Effect of Tort Law on Per Capita Income Growth

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
State GDP
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-0.0001
0.5680
0.4307
0.3206
-0.0001
-0.0112
-0.2956
0.0042
-0.4018
26.0584
0.4 444

PRI
0.72860
1.6769
1.4964
0.4416
-0.0039
-0.0309
1.8426
-0.0838
-0.3864
-11.5629
0.5519

There is a very strong association between more prodefendant law on the PRI scale and lower per capita growth
(higher PRI scores are pro-plaintiff). The PRI results provide
evidence that tort law regimes influence the economy, but in
the opposite direction suggested by tort reformers. This might
suggest that more plaintiff-friendly tort law helps the economy.
While counterintuitive, it is somewhat plausible, given the economic benefits associated with tort law, as discussed above.
The following figure illustrates the association of the two
variables, with confidence intervals on a linear fitted model.
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Figure 3
Relationship Between Tort Law and Economic Growth

The effect of tort law, as measured by PRI, is quite dramatic. The expected growth rate for the decade for a state with the
most pro-defendant law was only 5%, while the most proplaintiff regime was associated with an expected growth rate of
nearly 20%.
This strong and sizable association appears to be powerful
evidence for the positive effect of tort law, but it must be
viewed with caution. Such associations may be epiphenomenal
and due to some third factor not considered in the regression
analysis. Although I employed the most prominent control variables, some other factor may have driven the results for this
particular time period. The remainder of the analyses will
search for the pathways of the effect of tort law, such as productivity, investment, and entrepreneurship.
V. PATHWAYS FOR TORT LAW TO AFFECT THE
GENERAL ECONOMY
A. PRODUCTIVITY
One possible measure that could identify a tort liability regime effect is productivity. Productivity is essentially a test of
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the efficiency of business operations.216 Thus, a Federal Reserve
Bank analysis noted that when ―gauging the health of the regional economy, arguably the two most important series to
track are employment and output,‖ and ―combined they form a
measure of productivity that in the long run ultimately drives
living standards.‖217 Productivity is a commonly used proxy for
measuring the effects of government regulations on the economy.218 Lower productivity means an inability to compete in the
market.219 Thus, this represents a good measure of a state‘s
economic health.
Tort liability could hamper productivity in various ways.
The payouts required in such cases could reduce investment
that would benefit productivity. Liability might reduce ―the
rate of both new innovations and the implementation of existing innovations,‖ which could hamper productivity growth.220
Some research has shown that tort reform improved state
productivity.221 In asbestos litigation, for example, statutorily
avoiding the ―vagaries of the tort system would enable capital
markets to accurately assess the costs to individual businesses
and insurers, which could reduce the cost of capital for these
business and insurers, leading to increased productivity and
investment.‖222 It thus seems unlikely that stricter tort liability
would increase productivity. There is some evidence, however,
that tort law may increase innovation.223 Businesses are also
plaintiffs, as well as defendants, so pro-plaintiff tort law might
benefit them.

216. See PAUL W. BAUER & YOONSOO LEE, ESTIMATING GSP AND LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY BY STATE 3 ( Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 16, 2006), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/policydis/
pdpno16.pdf.
217. Id.; see also Andrew B. Bernard & Charles I. Jones, Comparing Apples
to Oranges: Productivity Convergence and Measurement Across Industries and
Countries, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1216, 1216 (1996) (suggesting that
―[c]omparisons of productivity performance across countries are central to
many of the questions concerning long-run economic growth‖).
218. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33
J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 150–53 (1995).
219. See id. at 133.
220. Campbell et al., supra note 119.
221. See id. at 109.
222. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991,
996 (2005).
223. See Barton, supra note 93, at 301.

80

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:28

The EPI study found no effect over time in the United
States between tort costs and productivity growth, but it included no control variables, and many other factors could affect
productivity.224 In addition, the productivity growth in this
country could have been a result of companies shifting operations to more pro-defendant jurisdictions.
My next analysis compares relative state manufacturing
productivity with their tort liability regimes, as measured by
the Chamber and PRI. Productivity is measured as manufacturing value added per production hour worked, adjusted by
industrial sector.225
Table 6
Effect of Tort Law on Manufacturing Productivity

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
8.5669
0.4547
-1.5379
-0.5651
0.3470
-0.8076
0.4753
0.3831
33.5530
0.5977

PRI
0.7418
1.677
00.8363
-0.35822
0.3412
1.8349
0.2815
0.4531
24.2429
0.6051

Urbanization is apparently the primary determinant of
manufacturing productivity, though higher Chamber scores
were associated with higher productivity.
While the PRI score was not statistically significant, it
neared this level (p, 0.10). This provided evidence that proplaintiff tort law was associated with higher manufacturing
productivity with a significant coefficient, given the scale of this
measure. Although not statistically significant, the effect of the
Chamber measure was material (one unit higher Chamber
224. Ross Eisenbrey, Tort Costs and the Economy: Myths, Exaggerations,
and Propaganda, ECON. POL‘Y INST. (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.epi.org/
publication/bp174.
225. Data for this variable are taken from ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT
ANDES, THE 2008 STATE NEW ECONOMY INDEX (2008), available at http://www.itif
.org/files/2008_State_New_Economy_Index.pdf.
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score represented about a five percent increase in manufacturing productivity).
B. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The next analysis involves foreign direct investment in the
states. Various studies have suggested the value of foreign direct investment to international economic growth.226 More investment is economically valuable, and foreign investment is
an outside inflow of money that does not require additional
domestic savings (and hence reduced consumption). Economic
evidence testifies to the importance of foreign investment for
the growth of American states as well.227 One study found that
foreign capital accounted for 3.7% of state output growth between 1995 and 1999 and over 16.7% of state manufacturing
output growth.228
A greater risk of tort liability could deter foreign investment. The United States Department of Commerce has suggested that international investors are concerned with the
―comparatively high legal cost of doing business in the U.S.
market‖ and the ―unpredictable and unfamiliar nature of liability in the United States.‖229 Surveys similarly suggest that investors heavily weigh the litigation environment in deciding
where to locate.230 However, it is not necessarily the case that
more pro-defendant tort law is more predictable or desirable.
Perhaps foreign investors find pro-plaintiff law more predictable, and it may have attendant economic benefits.
The next regression focuses on the relative amount of foreign direct investment in the states.231 The theory is that foreign investors are more likely to do business in a state with a
more favorable tort climate. Indeed, even if tort law were eco226. See, e.g., Laura Alfaro et al., FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of
Local Financial Markets, 64 J. INT‘L ECON. 89, 108 (2004); E. Borensztein et
al., How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT‘L
ECON. 115, 134 (1998). The effect appears to be most pronounced in countries
that already had higher GDP. See Wu Jyun-Yi & Hsu Chih-Chiang, Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Economic Growth? Evidence from a Threshold
Regression Analysis, 15 ECON. BULL. 1, 2 (2008).
227. Megan A. Torau & Ernest Goss, The Effects of Foreign Capital on
State Economic Growth, 18 ECON. DEV. Q. 255, 266 (2004).
228. Id. at 263–65.
229. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, supra note 100, at 5.
230. Id. at 7.
231. The measure for this variable is the percentage of each state‘s workforce employed by foreign companies. For the source of data for this variable,
see ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 225.
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nomically efficient in a given state, a foreign company might
prefer to operate in a state with a less restrictive, inefficient
tort law (so long as it was more likely to be a defendant than a
plaintiff). This test may therefore not be a reliable guide to the
most efficient tort law, but it is a reasonable place to search for
evidence of some economic effect from the state of such law.
I adopt the same method as for the preceding studies, and
the results are displayed in the following table.
Table 7
Effect of Tort Law on Foreign Direct Investment

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
0.7374
-0.4651
-0.9740
0.1043
-0.0143
0.1705
0.0325
0.0759
-5.1449
0.6162

PRI
-0.0095
-0.4741
-0.8331
0.1128
-0.0149
0.2613
0.0321
0.0782
-3.1387
0.5889

There is no evidence for an effect of state tort law on foreign direct investments. The Chamber and PRI scores are in
the direction of foreign investors preferring pro-defendant state
law but are not statistically significant, nor are they substantively material.
The measures of manufacturing productivity and foreign
direct investment provide no clear evidence for the effect of tort
law. There is some suggestion of a negative effect from the
Chamber measure, though it is weak. The PRI measure actually suggests that pro-plaintiff state tort law could benefit its
economy.
C. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
This Section considers the effect of state tort legal regimes
on measures of state entrepreneurship. This may provide a
more refined measure for the effect, as entrepreneurs may be
especially susceptible to tort liability risk. Examination of
small business may well be where the effects of state tort litiga-
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tion are most likely to be found. A study conducted by National
Economic Research Associates for the Chamber of Commerce
has found that small businesses are especially vulnerable to litigation risk.232 The small business share of commercial tort liability costs was substantially in excess of its share of business
revenues.233 The liability cost per $1000 revenues for businesses with revenue of less than $5 million could be twenty times
greater than that for businesses with over $50 million in
revenue.234
Focusing on entrepreneurship could also capture the
claimed anti-innovative effect of tort law in America.235
Through classical Schumpeterian creative destruction, entrepreneurship is the source of much innovation.236 Greater entrepreneurship is also associated with more innovation, which in
turn is associated with higher economic growth.237 Studying effects of tort law on entrepreneurship thus may capture the innovation effect as well as economic growth effects of the liability system in a state. If pro-plaintiff tort law stimulates
innovation, this might appear in the entrepreneurial measures.
Entrepreneurship also provides a better metric for isolating the differential effects of state tort liability laws. Large
companies operate throughout the entire nation, and their
practices may well be driven, or at least influenced, by the nation‘s most restrictive tort regime. Certainly, large states with
many more potential plaintiffs will have a disproportionate effect on interstate businesses‘ calculations of whether to produce
232. See JUDYTH W. PENDELL, U.S. CHAMBER INSTIT. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
TORT LIABILITY COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 7–8 (2007), available at http://
www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_ILR_tort_ May2007.pdf.
233. Id. at 6.
234. Id. at 10.
235. See Barton, supra note 93, at 301–02 (contending that entrepreneurial
activity receives the innovation benefits of tort liability).
236. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
viii (1985) (referring to entrepreneurship as ―the carrier of innovation‖).
237. See, e.g., Poh Kam Wong et al., Entrepreneurship, Innovation and
Economic Growth: Evidence from GEM Data, 24 SMALL BUS. ECON. 335, 342–
44 (2005) (reporting statistical correlation between certain types of entrepreneurship and economic growth). Turbulence (the entry and exit of firms from
the market) is associated with economic growth in the United States. Paul D.
Reynolds, Creative Destruction: Source or Symptom of Economic Growth?, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE MACROECONOMY 97, 97 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 1999). Just having a greater
number of competitors in the market may be associated with higher growth.
Stephen J. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 104 J. POL.
ECON. 724, 741 (1996).
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a product or how to manufacture it. Small entrepreneurs, by
contrast, have less interstate exposure and should be more influenced by the tort law of the state in which they operate.
Consequently, entrepreneurship may offer the best test of the
economic effects of a state‘s tort liability system.238
Entrepreneurship theoretically could be measured in various ways. One could consider the simple number of new enterprises registered by a state, but this will be distorted by other
state law variables. For example, many entities choose to incorporate in Delaware, but this is presumably based upon the
state‘s substantive corporate law or its relative judicial quality.
For my tests, I use data from the Kauffman Foundation,239
which has produced detailed state comparisons for several entrepreneurship measures.
From this source, I consider the variables for initial public
offerings (IPOs) as a share of worker earnings, total entrepreneurial activity (adjusted number of new businesses), and venture capital invested as a share of worker earnings.240 The first
is a measure of highly successful entrepreneurship, the second
a measure of overall entrepreneurship, and the third is an intermediate market measure of outside investors‘ assessment of
the climate for entrepreneurial success.
I first measure associations with intrastate IPOs. A very
successful entrepreneurial business will wish to expand
through the sale of shares to the public, which requires an IPO.
To the degree that tort law influences a small business‘s prospects for growth, this measure might capture its effects.

238. This is not a perfect measure, as it is distorted by the interests of entrepreneurs, which may not align with those of society as a whole. If entrepreneurs are more likely to be defendants than plaintiffs, they may even prefer
an inefficiently pro-defendant state of tort law. Entrepreneurship is very important to economic growth, though, so it provides a good proxy for this important concern.
239. ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 225.
240. For a more detailed description of these measures, see id. at 32–33, 50.
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Table 8
Effect of Tort Law on Initial Public Offerings

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-0.6304
-0.1635
0.1770
0.0323
0.0229
0.1282
-0.0221
-0.0418
5.0307
0.3988

PRI
-0.0428
-0.1777
0.0719
-0.0233
0.0235
0.0245
-0.0187
-0.0445
3.8517
0.3709

From these results, there appears to be no association between state tort liability regimes and the frequency of initial
public offerings. The PRI rating is in the expected direction but
nowhere near statistical significance. The Chamber rating is in
the opposite direction (pro-defendant law associated with fewer
IPOs) but not statistically significant.
The next assessment involves the Kauffman Foundation‘s
evaluation of the total entrepreneurial activity in a state. This
uses the same model as above, with reports in the following
table.
Table 9
Effect of Tort Law on Entrepreneurial Activity

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-0.0319
-0.0085
0.0095
0.0044
-0.0018
-0.0060
-0.0010
0.0002
0.4706
0.1499

PRI
-0.0050
-0.1653
0.0093
0.0033
0.0012
-0.0200
0.0001
-0.0002
0.5897
0.1805
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There is no identifiable association between entrepreneurial activity and either of our measures of tort law. The PRI test
is closer to suggesting an adverse effect of tort law (p = 0.23),
but still well away from statistical significance.
For yet another test of tort law‘s effect, I consider venture
capital investing. Venture capitalists might well be more informed of and attuned to state tort law that affects the success
of those starting up entrepreneurial ventures. The following
table reports the results of this analysis.
Table 10
Effect of Tort Law on Venture Capital

Chamber of Commerce
PRI
Civil Law
Social Capital
Human Capital
Urbanization
Government Size
Ideology
Manufacturing
Constant
R-Squared

Chamber
-0.3277
0.0280
0.0671
0.0318
0.0055
0.0020
-0.0001
0.0001
0.6208
0.4456

PRI
-0.0015
0.0231
0.0108
0.0273
0.0058
-0.0491
0.0012
-0.0012
-0.6098
0.3892

The PRI estimate is not close to statistical significance.
The Chamber measure is actually near statistical significance
(p = 0.09), but in the direction of more pro-plaintiff law being
associated with more venture capital investment. None of the
other variables adds much to the assessment, though human
capital is associated with more such investment in the model
using the Chamber scores. Although there was reason to believe that entrepreneurs could be particularly sensitive to the
state of local tort law, the analyses found little hint of such an
effect.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence shows no
negative economic effects from more pro-plaintiff tort law.
While the Chamber measure showed no material association
with the economic variables (although it was somewhat correlated with higher insurance costs), there is a surprising associ-
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ation with the PRI variable measuring actual tort doctrines.
More pro-plaintiff law is associated with higher economic
growth. I ran separate regressions with individual doctrinal
components of the measure, and they showed no such association but the cumulative score is quite dramatic. Perhaps state
law is too pro-defendant.
As discussed above, it is theoretically plausible that more
pro-plaintiff tort law could be economically beneficial. If so, one
would expect more profound effects to be found where the law
was most pro-defendant. This can be detected through a technique known as quantile regression.241 I tested this at three levels, the 25th percentile (more pro-defendant), the 50th percentile (median) and the 75th percentile (more pro-plaintiff), with
the results reported in Table 11.
Table 11
Quantile Regression of PRI Scale and Economic Growth

25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile

Coefficient
0.9128
0.7263
0.6778

Probability
0.0003
0.0470
0.1470

The results provide some support for the conclusion that
pro-plaintiff law benefits the economy. At the level of states
with more pro-defendant law, the results are highly significant,
but for states with more pro-plaintiff law, statistical significance disappears. Moreover, the size of the coefficient steadily
decreases as law becomes more pro-plaintiff. Even at the 75th
percentile, though, there is still a positive association.
The analyses provide inconclusive findings on the effects of
tort law on the economy. The findings on the association of PRI
scores with state GDP growth are strong and significant, but
there is reason to doubt them. The PRI scores did not associate
with the output category of insurance costs, which would likely
be the route through which tort law hampered economic
growth.
However, it is possible that the positive economic effects of
tort law might not appear as higher insurance costs if the anticipation of such higher insurance costs caused business to alter
241. For a discussion of quantile regression, see generally ROGER KOENKREGRESSION (2005).
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their behavior to avoid such higher insurance costs. As with the
international growth evidence, many significant associations
will prove spurious and not robust to different time periods or
control variables.242 Moreover, given the nature of statistical
significance, some associations will appear by random chance
variation rather than a true association.
There are also other possible problems with the PRI association. The correlation was between the state of tort law and
growth for the prior ten years, which relies on a premise that
tort law was stable over this time, which is not established. As
with any correlation, there is a possible directionality problem—it may be that economic growth produces more proplaintiff tort law regimes, rather than the hypothesized effect.
Perhaps economic growth makes judges more complacent and
causes them to create more pro-plaintiff tort law doctrines.
It may be meaningful that the Chamber of Commerce
scores showed no significant association with the economic variables, except for manufacturing productivity, for which more
pro-plaintiff law was economically better. As the Chamber
notes, business decisions are presumably grounded in perceptions of businesspersons.243 The perceptions measured by the
Chamber do not track either the actual law measured by PRI or
the hypothesized economic effects. The lack of association between the Chamber‘s perception measure and the PRI‘s actual
measure also raises questions about the findings on the effect
of PRI‘s assessment of tort law on the economy. If businesspersons do not perceive the state of tort law accurately, it seems
less likely that the true state of the law would have a substantial impact on business decisions.
The general insignificance of the control variables may also
be reason to question the results. While I have employed the
control variables most expected to be predictive of my dependent variables, some other unmeasured variable may be explaining the results. For this to be true, though, that unknown
variable would have to be one that is very highly correlated
with the PRI score.
Yet another possibility is that the economic costs of tort regimes may be largely exported to other states, which would obscure any association in a study of the states.244 Costs imposed
242. See supra Part V.B (discussing the effects of tort liability on foreign
investment and international economic growth).
243. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 141, at 101.
244. I attempted to adjust for this with my measures for entrepreneurial
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by the tort system of one state may be felt directly by businesses of another state, and lawyers may adapt to state law differences by forum shopping.245 If this were the case, the effects of
state legal differences might not appear in state economies,
even if the legal differences were having some economic effect.
Such a result might counsel for national action, though this
case also remains unproved.
Consequently, there are reasons to doubt the findings on
the effect of the PRI measure and state economic growth. However, the association is an especially strong one, so it should not
be cavalierly dismissed either. The quantile regression provides
some additional support for the conclusion, suggesting that further investigation is warranted. Nor does this isolated association provide conclusive evidence that pro-plaintiff tort law benefits the economy, given the lack of significant results in other
regressions. However, the finding is powerful evidence that tort
law is at least not harming the states‘ economies.246 With such
a strong relationship between pro-plaintiff tort law and economic growth, it is difficult to imagine some unmeasured factor
that could reverse such a relationship.

activity, on the presumption that these effects would have a greater intrastate
effect, but this presumption may be incorrect.
245. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442
(2008) (noting that ―plaintiffs‘ lawyers react to changes that make litigation
more difficult in one court system by moving their cases to other court systems, while defense counsel seek forum advantages for their clients by using
the tools available to them to affect the site of litigation‖).
246. This contrary result is sometimes known as a ―backfire‖ effect and
provides the strongest evidence of no positive effect. See David Weisburd et al.,
When Can We Conclude that Treatments or Programs ―Don’t Work‖?, 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 31, 42 (2003).

